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NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 
ROBERT KNOWLES* 
ABSTRACT 
 Agencies performing national security functions regulate citizens’ lives in increasingly 
intimate ways. Yet national security rulemaking is a mystery to most Americans. Many 
rules—like those implementing the National Security Agency’s vast surveillance schemes—
remain secret. Others are published, but the deliberations that led to them and the legal 
justifications for them remain hidden.  
 Ordinarily, these rules would undergo the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-
comment process, which has earned wide, if not universal, praise for advancing democratic 
values and enhancing agency effectiveness. But a national security exception from notice-
and-comment in the APA itself, along with the overuse of classification authority, combine 
to insulate most national security rulemaking from public scrutiny and meaningful judicial 
review. The result is a national security administrative state that is insular and unaccount-
able to the public.  
 Some scholars find this exceptional treatment inevitable, while others have proposed 
reforms. But no one has sought to provide a full accounting of national security rulemak-
ing’s scope and historical origins. By doing so, this Article demonstrates that the APA excep-
tion is historically contingent—a response to the rise of totalitarian states and the Second 
World War. As a product of its time rather than an essential attribute of all administrative 
law systems, it is a relic in a globalized world in which the foreign and the domestic are 
increasingly intertwined, and the line between national security and ordinary rulemaking 
therefore begins to fade entirely.  
 This Article suggests reforms that would increase public deliberation in national securi-
ty rulemaking, while accounting for the importance of secret-keeping when truly necessary. 
Among these proposed reforms is a change to the current practice allowing national security 
agencies to invoke the security exception to notice-and-comment after a rule is challenged in 
court, rather than at the notice-and-comment stage itself. These reforms would improve the 
current rulemaking practice, which undermines the transparency necessary for effective 
democratic participation. 
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 “There are exceptions. If they cannot be explained, then the univer-
sal cannot be explained, either.”1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 2013, a series of leaks and disclosures revealed that the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) conducts mass surveillance of Ameri-
cans’ private electronic information on an unprecedented scale.2 The 
content of e-mails, web searches, and phone calls of millions are regu-
larly stored in databases, along with the metadata3 for such commu-
nications of hundreds of millions.4 Under certain rules—many still 
secret—agencies such as the FBI and DOJ may access these records 
to investigate unlawful activity by foreigners.5 But the difference be-
tween “foreign” and “American” often hangs on low-level NSA ana-
lysts’ judgment calls or search algorithms.6 And if these investigations 
                                                                                                                  
 1. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING/REPETITION 227 (Howard V. Hong & 
Edna H. Hong trans., Princeton University Press 1983) (1843). 
 2. The legal authorization for much of this surveillance was obtained by the FBI and 
the Department of Justice. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence 
Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST 
(June 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-
from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-
8845-d970ccb04497_story.html. 
 3. Metadata is not the content of a record or communication but the information 
about it, such as the time, date, and parties involved. See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter 
with Metadata?, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/06/verizon-nsa-metadata-surveillance-problem.html. However, 
metadata is often more useful for information-gathering than the content itself. See id. 
 4. See James Bamford, They Know Much More Than You Think, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/nsa-they-know-
much-more-you-think/?pagination=false (observing that metadata of telephone communi-
cations of “hundreds of millions of Americans” had been collected); Barton Gellman, U.S. 
Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, WASH. 
POST (June 15, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-15/news/39993852_ 
1_comey-national-intelligence-intelligence-collection (describing the PRISM and 
NUCLEON Programs, which collect Internet and phone call content, respectively); Siobhan 
Gorman, Evan Perez & Janet Hook, U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578529112289298922 
(describing the collection of phone and credit card transaction metadata); Glenn Green-
wald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN 
(London) (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order (same); Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA 
is Still Harvesting Your Online Data, GUARDIAN (London) (June 27, 3013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection (describing 
the collection of Internet metadata). 
 5. See Gellman & Poitras, supra note 2. 
 6. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Hay-
stacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2010) (“Instead of building toward an individual FISA 
application by developing leads on individuals with some connection to an international 
terrorist organization . . . officials now develop algorithms that search thousands or even 
millions of collected e-mail messages and telephone calls for indications of suspicious activ-
ities.”); Glenn Greenwald & James Ball, The Top Secret Rules That Allow NSA to Use US 
2014]  NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 885  
 
uncover illegal activity by Americans—even inadvertently—the infor-
mation is passed to other agencies for investigation and prosecution.7  
 This surveillance is far broader and deeper than previously under-
stood.8 But it is also, to the surprise of many, arguably lawful.9 The 
USA PATRIOT Act10 and the updated Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (FISA)11 give agencies wide discretion to obtain and search 
private electronic files.12 The government claims that publicly availa-
                                                                                                                  
Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN (London) (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant. 
 7. See Greenwald & Ball, supra note 6. The DEA has a secretive Special Operations 
Unit (SOP) that funnels information from intelligence databases to law enforcement agen-
cies, which use it to launch investigations but do not disclose how these investigations 
begin. See John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up 
Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/ 2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805. 
 8. For a history of the NSA’s surveillance of Americans in the first decade after the 
September 11 attacks, see generally JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-
SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008). 
 9. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, DNI STATEMENT ON RECENT 
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (2013), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/868-dni-
statement-on-recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information (defending the 
leaked surveillance program as having “been authorized by all three branches of  
the Government”). 
 10. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272. 
 11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1855 (2006). 
FISA was amended in 2008 to update and expand legal authority to search electronic in-
formation. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 102, 122 Stat. 2436, 
2459-60 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812). 
 12. The government has not disclosed its complete legal justification for the NSA’s 
programs, but some of the provisions that have been or may be relied on include USA 
PATRIOT Act § 216, 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (expanding the availability of “pen register” 
devices to encompass interception of internet metadata); USA PATRIOT Act § 214, 50 
U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2006) (lowering the standard for obtaining internet metadata so that the 
FBI need only certify to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that the infor-
mation likely to be obtained is “relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against in-
ternational terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”); USA PATRIOT Act § 21, 50 
U.S.C. § 1861 (2006) (the so-called “business records” provision, apparently interpreted by 
the FISC, in a secret opinion, to authorize the FBI to obtain all of a carrier’s phone metada-
ta, see David Cole, Can Privacy Be Saved?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/06/can-privacy-be-saved/?pagination= 
false); and FISA Amendments Act § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006) (allowing the govern-
ment to acquire foreign intelligence by obtaining the content of communications by non-
U.S. persons “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S. borders, and interpreted to authorize 
the collection of phone and Internet content of Americans in the process). 
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ble regulations13 and executive orders14 authorize parts of the contro-
versial program. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), 
through secret orders, approved some aspects.15 But most rules im-
plementing the program were developed and approved internally by 
agencies through secret rulemaking. Leaks or public pressure even-
tually forced disclosure of many rules, but secrecy still enshrouds the 
processes that led to them and even the legal authority for them.16  
 Secret rulemaking makes up a growing portion of the federal gov-
ernment’s “legislative” rules—those that, among other things, pre-
scribe rights or duties and fill statutory gaps—which have the force 
of law.17 Yet under fundamental administrative law principles enu-
                                                                                                                  
 13. See NSA, UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18: LEGAL 
COMPLIANCE AND MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (1993), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ns 
archiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07-01.htm (prescribing NSA safeguards for protecting consti-
tutional rights of U.S. persons and regulating the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of information concerning U.S. persons); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 16 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf (authorizing agents to engage in 
proactive intelligence gathering in a manner “not limited to ‘investigation’ in a narrow 
sense”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES 
OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS (1982), availa-
ble at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/ corres/pdf/524001r.pdf (regulating the role of DoD 
personnel and resources in the NSA programs). 
 14. Executive Order 12,333 authorizes the NSA to collect “foreign intelligence or coun-
terintelligence” information while not “acquiring information concerning the domestic ac-
tivities of United States persons.” Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 211 (1981). This 
executive order was most recently amended by Executive Order 13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218, 229 
(2008), which authorizes the NSA to “[p]rescribe . . . security regulations” consistent with 
its authority. 
 15. See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(July 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-
powers-of-nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. FISA created the FISC to oversee requests for 
surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence agents inside the United 
States by federal law enforcement agencies. See id. The FISC has been widely criticized for 
its extreme deference to agencies and overly broad interpretations of statutory authority. 
See, e.g., Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Congressman, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 6, 2013), available at 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sensenbrenner_letter_to_attorney_general_er
ic_holder.pdf (noting objections by the Patriot Act’s principal author to overly broad inter-
pretations used to justify the NSA programs); infra Part II.C.  
 16. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 632 
(2010) (noting that the Attorney General Guidelines regulating domestic intelligence-
gathering by the FBI were traditionally kept secret but are now available online); Gellman 
& Poitras, supra note 2 (describing secret rules instructing NSA analysts to enter search 
terms “that are designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a target’s ‘foreignness’ ”); 
Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 7 (describing secret documents regulating the DEA’s Special 
Operations Division’s use of electronic information). 
 17. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 475 
(2013); see also Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Legisla-
tive rules . . . create rights, impose obligations, or effect a change in existing law pursuant 
to authority delegated by Congress.”); United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (describing legislative rules as those “in which the agency sought to fill gaps and 
inconsistencies left by the statutory scheme”); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 
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merated in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),18 these legisla-
tive rules must ordinarily be published and undergo the notice-and-
comment process before they take effect.19 Notice-and-comment—
through which the public engages in dialogue with agencies, requiring 
them to respond to its concerns—safeguards democratic values and en-
hances the quality of rulemaking.20 A prominent scholar in the field 
called it “[o]ne of the [g]reatest [i]nventions of [m]odern [g]overnment.”21  
 Quite often, however, notice-and-comment is missing from nation-
al security rulemaking. Classification authority trumps other publi-
cation requirements,22 making notice-and-comment impossible.23 A 
massive amount of government activity takes place entirely in secret. 
By 2009, 1074 federal government organizations worked on programs 
                                                                                                                  
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1708-09 (2007) (describing the difficulty courts sometimes encoun-
ter distinguishing legislative or “substantive” rules from merely “interpretive” rules). 
 18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2012); see also infra Part II.A (describing the APA’s funda-
mental importance in American law). 
 19. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (This provision states that “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule 
making shall be published in the Federal Register” unless there is “actual notice,” and 
requires that the notice include “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public 
rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved.”); id. § 553(c) (requiring that agencies provide opportunity for 
public and interested parties to respond to the agency notice of rulemaking by tendering 
written opinions, information, or statements); id. § 553(d) (requiring a minimum thirty-day 
grace period between the announcement of a rule and its effective date); Gersen, supra 
note 17, at 1709-11 (explaining that legislative rules, also known as “substantive” rules, 
may only be promulgated through notice and comment unless a statutory exception ap-
plies). 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).  
 22. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making 
Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221, 238-40 (1972). The APA’s publication requirements 
originally included an exception for “any function of the United States requiring secrecy in 
the public interest.” Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 
238 (1946). When the APA was amended by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Pub. 
L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552), Congress included two excep-
tions related to national security—Exception 1, which authorizes withholding information 
classified “by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), and Exception 3, which authorizes withholding infor-
mation “exempted from disclosure by statute,” id. § 552(b)(3).  
 23. Because the existence of many national security-related agencies and programs is 
secret, it is impossible to know how many legislative rules are developed in secret. See 
infra Part II.C. Examples of statutes that authorize secret rulemaking include 50 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 831–832 (West 2012) (providing limitations and guidelines on who has access to classi-
fied information at the NSA); id. § 3024(g) (holding the Director of National Intelligence 
accountable for safeguarding intelligence information from disclosure); id. § 3161 (govern-
ing the process of classifying information and accessing classified information); id. § 3365 
(limiting the dissemination of privileged information); id. § 3121 (punishing individuals 
who reveal the identity of undercover agents and classified information); and id. § 3142 
(allowing operational files of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to be kept secret 
from the public). See also Sudha Setty, The Rise of National Security Secrets, 44 CONN. L. 
REV. 1563, 1583 (2012) (discussing the dangers of allowing “invocations of secrecy to  
go unchecked”). 
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at the top-secret level alone.24 The number of agencies and employees 
working on merely “secret” level programs is surely much larger.25 
Amid these agencies’ secret rulemaking lie the great “unknown un-
knowns” of the administrative state.26  
 We can learn a great deal about dysfunctions in national security 
rulemaking when leaks reveal programs like the NSA’s. But we can 
learn even more from national security rulemaking that the public 
knows about but cannot participate in. I call this opaque rulemak-
ing.27 It accounts for a larger share of national security rulemaking 
than secret rulemaking and is much broader in scope. It includes, for 
example, regulations implementing treaties28 and altering the legal 
rights of immigrants.29  
 Opaque rulemaking occurs when an agency makes legislative 
rules available to the public through some means, but refuses to con-
duct notice-and-comment or explain why.30 The authority to bypass 
notice-and-comment this way comes from a little-understood but 
broadly interpreted exception in the APA for “foreign affairs or mili-
tary functions.”31 I call this the national security exception.32 
                                                                                                                  
 24. See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New 
American Security State 86 (2011). 
 25. See id. at 86-87. 
 26. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 
12, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcript 
id=2636. As David Posen has explained, Rumsfeld’s (infamous) taxonomy aptly describes 
“deep secrets”—those about which Americans “are in the dark about the fact that they are 
being kept in the dark.” David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010). 
 27. Opaque rulemaking creates what David Pozen calls “shallow” secrets: the public 
knows about the secret’s existence only from the publicly available final rule. See Pozen, 
supra note 26, at 260. 
 28. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peña, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that regulations made pursuant to NAFTA exempting Mexican truck drivers from Fed-
eral Highway Administration (FWHA) licensing guidelines could be promulgated without 
notice-and-comment). 
 29. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 436-38 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding, under the 
APA exception, the DOJ’s failure to use notice-and-comment to determine the countries 
whose citizens would be required to report to the FBI under a post-September 11 registration 
program, and who could be detained or deported in secret for immigration law violations).  
 30. Such rules can be published in the Code of Federal Regulations, the Federal Reg-
ister, or simply online. Secret rulemaking becomes opaque when the content of the rules is 
made available, through leaks or deliberate disclosure, to the public. 
 31. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (stating that notice-and-comment requirements 
apply “except to the extent that there is involved a military or foreign affairs function of 
the United States”). 
 32. See infra Part II.C. The term “national security” lacks a precise definition, but it 
seems to be an ever-expanding concept. The Department of Defense recently defined it as 
“[a] collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United 
States.” DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF 
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 182 (2010) (as amended through Jan. 15, 2014). I use the 
term here in an even broader sense—to include these subjects and any action that may fall 
under the exception in 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). 
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 While some scholars regard the exception as inevitable,33 and oth-
ers have proposed reforms to increase transparency,34 the full scope 
and historical origins of national security rulemaking—both secret 
and opaque—remain largely unexplored. Secrecy makes a complete 
accounting impossible, but this Article uncovers two unique features 
that expose the constitutionally problematic way this rulemaking is 
conducted and point the way toward necessary reforms. 
 First, this Article considers the entire corpus of cases discussing 
the APA exception, concluding that courts generally apply it even 
when it was not invoked by the agency until the rule was challenged 
in court.35 This makes it difficult to estimate how often agencies ac-
tually rely on the exception to avoid notice-and-comment.36 It also 
makes court oversight of national security rulemaking far weaker. 
Under the Chenery rule, courts will uphold agency rules only on the 
grounds articulated by the agency when the rule was developed.37 
Chenery I enables courts to perform their constitutionally critical role 
of ensuring that agencies do not exceed their delegated authority.38 
                                                                                                                  
 33. See Major Thomas R. Folk, The Administrative Procedure Act and the Military 
Departments, 108 MIL. L. REV. 135, 142 (1985) (observing with approval that “[s]everal 
court decisions have . . . given the term ‘military function’ its broadest possible definition”); 
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2009) (briefly discussing the exception as one of many “black holes” in U.S. administrative 
law and noting that courts have generally construed it broadly). 
 34. Bonfield, supra note 22, at 238 (conceding that, while a narrow construction would 
be preferable, the language of the “military or foreign affairs function” exception is never-
theless “very broad”); Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 192-93, 204 (2011) (proposing that the 
exception be eliminated and that agencies use the APA’s “good cause” exception when no-
tice-and-comment is inappropriate); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over Interna-
tional Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 223-24, 262-63 (2009) (noting that 
the exception relieves the President of the responsibility for conducting notice-and-
comment for international agreements, and proposing reforms); C. Jeffrey Tibbels, Deline-
ating the Foreign Affairs Function in the Age of Globalization, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 389 (1999) (contending that agencies use the exception too often for economic regula-
tion, and proposing that the courts rein in its use); see also William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-
and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade: Height-
ened Need, No Response, 99 YALE L.J. 669, 671 (1989) (proposing a statutory grant of no-
tice-and-comment for rulemaking on the classification of imported goods, which is subject 
to the exception). 
 35. See infra notes 161-56 and accompanying text. 
 36. Over the decades, the exception has been invoked by agencies across the govern-
ment—including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State, Commerce, 
Treasury, Energy, Transportation, and Agriculture; the Federal Communications Commis-
sion; the Food and Drug Administration; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and even 
the Postal Service. See Bonfield, supra note 22, at 232 n.38; see also id. at 232-34 (describ-
ing various agencies’ responses to a survey, stating they had relied on the exception and 
concluding that “[i]n practice . . . most agencies do not usually exercise their discretion to 
follow the [notice-and-comment] requirements . . . when they are not bound to do so be-
cause” the exception applies); infra Part II.C. 
 37. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943); infra Part II.B. 
 38. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE 
L.J. 952, 958-59 (2007); infra Part II.B. 
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When the agency does not use notice-and-comment, however—or of-
fer any justification for departing from it—there are no legal or fac-
tual justifications for the court to review.  
 Second, this Article examines, for the first time, the exception’s 
development through numerous drafts of APA predecessor legislation 
over eighteen years and its historical and political context.39 This 
analysis reveals that the national security exception was not a simple 
inevitability; instead, it emerged from a fierce debate during the 1930s 
and 1940s about how the United States could best compete with fascist 
states without succumbing to fascism itself.40 When the APA exception 
is seen as a product of its time rather than an essential attribute of all 
administrative law systems, its purpose becomes clearer. 
 The Article proceeds in four parts. I focus on the national security 
exception in Part II, revealing the general operation of the national 
security administrative state. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is 
“the dominant mode of administrative action.”41 Because notice-and-
comment rulemaking is such an important means by which agencies 
create rules with the force of law, exceptions from it deserve special 
attention. By carving out the exception, the APA creates a distinct 
and constitutionally suspect administrative law regime for national 
security rulemaking.  
 As Part III explains, the limited scholarly debate over the APA 
exception has occurred without exploring its origins. Professor Adri-
an Vermeule, adopting the theories of German political theorist Carl 
Schmitt, labeled the exception one of the “black holes” permitting un-
trammeled executive discretion, which are “integral” and “inevitable” 
in “a massive and massively diverse administrative state.”42 Ver-
muele’s critics have argued that such black holes are not necessary 
and have proposed eliminating them.43 But Vermeule’s invocation of 
the APA exception fits neatly into discussion about emergency gov-
ernance—quite often grappling with Schmitt’s perspective—that has 
dominated national security law scholarship at least since September 
                                                                                                                  
 39. See infra Part IV. Scholars discussing the exception have examined the legislative 
history of the bill that became the APA, but not the rich history of earlier reform proposals 
or the historical context. See, e.g., Tibbels, supra note 34, at 395-96 (discussing the APA 
legislative history and noting its sparseness on the subject of the national security exception). 
 40. See infra Part IV. For a history of the New Deal in the context of the rise of totali-
tarian states around the world, see IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013). 
 41. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011). 
 42. Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1149. 
 43. For criticism of Vermeule’s observations, see, for example, Criddle, supra note 34, 
at 192, 193, 204. See also infra Part III. 
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11, 2001.44 This Article, in Part IV, re-orients that discussion by fo-
cusing on the specific geopolitical concerns and theories of govern-
mental organization animating the exception’s inclusion in the APA. 
 In Part V, this Article explores why national security rulemaking 
must be reformed and how to do so. Quite simply, the world has 
changed in fundamental ways since the APA was enacted. The dis-
tinction between the foreign and the domestic—and between what is 
and is not “national security”—has faded. Because people and prod-
ucts cross boundaries as never before, national security concerns con-
tinue to expand to new areas of government policymaking.45 And the 
threats America faces have changed dramatically as well. Our most 
dangerous enemies are no longer nation states, but terrorist organi-
zations or lone wolves.46 And in an era of high-tech global surveil-
lance where a mere search algorithm can determine the difference 
between what is foreign and domestic, the legitimating and delibera-
tion-enhancing qualities of notice-and-comment rulemaking are as 
necessary for national security agency action as for any other.47  
 Part V concludes by proposing reforms to an area of regulation 
badly in need of a balance between secrecy and greater scrutiny and 
public participation. If eliminating the APA exception entirely is not 
feasible, the President should issue an executive order requiring 
agencies to use notice-and-comment whenever possible. In addition, 
the courts should be directed to impose a Chenery-type rule requiring 
agencies to invoke the exception specifically when they issue a rule 
without notice-and-comment and to specifically articulate their rea-
sons for relying on the exception.48 Even if these justifications cannot 
be disclosed to the public for some time, or ever, the requirement will 
nonetheless discipline and improve agency decisionmaking. 
                                                                                                                  
 44. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 115-
16 (2012) (discussing the surge of interest in, and citation to, Schmitt following September 
11). Even before September 11, scholarly attention to the jurisprudence of emergency and 
exception—and the work of German political scientist Carl Schmitt in particular—was 
steadily increasing. See Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl 
Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm-Exception” Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1825, 1825-26 (2000) (noting the revival of interest in Schmitt’s work in the late 1990s). 
 45. See, e.g., William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in 
Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2010) (“[M]ore Americans than ever are engaged in 
international communications, and there is far greater intelligence interest in communica-
tions to and from Americans. Both circumstances increase the likelihood that the govern-
ment will be intercepting communications of innocent Americans . . . .”). 
 46. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 47. See infra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 48. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943); infra notes 109-
115 and accompanying text. 
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II.   OUR BIFURCATED ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 The United States government has a bifurcated administrative 
state. There is an ordinary administrative state, in which agencies 
must solicit and consider public comments before issuing rules with 
the force of law. And there is a national security administrative state, 
in which agencies may choose to issue the same sort of rules without 
first publishing them and without soliciting or receiving public com-
ments, while some rules may be kept entirely secret. The two admin-
istrative states co-exist within most agencies, but the national securi-
ty administrative state is more pervasive in the Departments of State 
and Defense and in the array of intelligence agencies that operate 
largely away from the public eye.49 
 Sometimes the two administrative states will co-exist within the 
same rulemaking process. Inevitably, however, in these instances it 
is the national security administrative state that governs the most 
important aspects of the rulemaking. After the September 11 attacks, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) established a Special Call-In Regis-
tration Program “requir[ing] non-immigrant alien males over the age 
of 16 from designated countries to appear for registration and finger-
printing.”50 The DOJ followed the APA’s notice-and-comment re-
quirements by publishing the proposed rule establishing the program 
and accepting public comments before issuing the final rule two 
months later.51 But the DOJ did not publish for public comment a 
crucial portion of the rule, which designates the countries whose citi-
zens must report.52 Nor did the DOJ explain why it had decided not 
to consider comments on this portion.53 
                                                                                                                  
 49. Secret rulemaking also accounts for a significant, and troubling, portion of the 
national security administrative state. See PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 24, at 86-87; supra 
notes 22-26 and accompanying text.  
 50. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 51. See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,581 
(proposed June 13, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214, 264). The proposed rule re-
ceived only fourteen comments, many of which were similar. See Registration and Monitor-
ing of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 214, 264). 
 52. See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
40,581 (stating that the selected countries whose citizens must report will be specified sep-
arately in notices published in the Federal Register); Registration and Monitoring of Cer-
tain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. at 52,584 (affirming this procedure in the final rule). 
 53. See Registration and Monitoring of Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,584, 
52,589 (Aug. 12, 2002) (stating, in response to a comment that the future designation of 
countries “would be antithetical to the relationship between the United States and that 
country and its citizens,” that “[t]he listing of countries from which nonimmigrant aliens 
will be subject to special registration is determined by the Attorney General in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, thereby ensuring that foreign policy implications will be con-
sidered when evaluating the possible designation of any specific country” and that the 
“comment is outside the scope of this final rule”). 
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 Three months later, the DOJ began publishing a series of notices 
in the Federal Register announcing the twenty-five designated coun-
tries—which included almost exclusively Muslim-majority nations 
such as Morocco, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Bahrain, and Tunisia.54 Thou-
sands of nonimmigrant alien visitors who reported to the FBI under 
this program were interrogated and deported, many of them in se-
cret, and hundreds were detained for significant periods of time.55  
 The Second Circuit upheld the program as lawful and explained 
why the DOJ was justified in invoking the national security excep-
tion. Providing justification where the DOJ had offered almost 
none,56 the court explained that, in the process of responding to com-
ments, the DOJ might have been required to reveal sensitive nation-
al security information in justifying its choice of countries, which 
would damage relations with those countries, slow down the designa-
tion process, and diminish the nation’s ability to collect intelligence 
and prevent terrorist attacks.57 
 These were legitimate concerns—at least in the abstract. But in 
practice, the registration program is widely considered to have been a 
failure.58 Like many of the post-September 11 detention and removal 
policies, it had troubling implications for due process and equal pro-
tection.59 Moreover, in targeting particular religious and ethnic com-
                                                                                                                  
 54. E.g., id. (designating Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria as countries whose citi-
zens meeting the conditions must report); Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens 
from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,526 (Nov. 22, 2002) (designating Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen). In a yet later notice, three more countries—Armenia, 
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—were added. Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens 
from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,136 (Dec. 16, 2002). A subsequent notice re-
moved Armenia from the list and modified the registration requirements. See Registration of 
Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,642 (Dec. 18, 2002). 
 55. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National 
Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1369, 1383-84 (2007); Sadiq Reza, A Trap for Middle Eastern Visitors, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 10, 2003, at A21. The program was only part of the constitutionally questionable de-
tention of thousands of Muslims in the United States following the September 11 attacks. 
See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22-46(2003); Johnson & Trujillo, supra, at 1382-84. 
 56. When publishing the notice listing designated countries, the DOJ stated that 
these determinations were justified “[i]n light of recent events, and based on intelligence 
information available to the Attorney General.” Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant 
Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. at 67,766. On appeal, the DOJ argued that 
“[p]ublic commentary . . . would serve no other purpose, and achieve no other end, than 
potentially inflaming relations” with the designated countries. Brief for Respondents at 37, 
Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3493), 2007 WL 6449014. 
 57. Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 58. Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 55, at 1384.  
 59. See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002); cf. Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration and We the People After September 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 420-
21 (2003) (disagreeing with Cole’s substantive arguments but agreeing that there are due 
process and equal protection concerns); see also Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Intern-
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munities and casting too broad a net, such policies alienated the very 
people who were most likely to provide the government with useful 
information for preventing future terrorist attacks.60 The resulting 
arrests, detentions, and deportations prompted protests.61 The DOJ 
never claimed that the program thwarted any terrorist activity, and 
it was abandoned a year later.62  
 The DOJ’s detention program demonstrates why the failure to in-
volve the public in rulemaking through notice-and-comment increas-
es the likelihood of impracticable, ill-conceived agency action that 
results in inefficiency, abuses, and backlash. Notice-and-comment 
was designed to avoid such harmful effects and to root policy-making 
in the constitutional values of public participation, transparency, le-
gitimacy, and governmental effectiveness.  
A.   The Importance of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
 The difference between our two administrative regimes in the way 
they are permitted to undertake rulemaking is not merely procedur-
al; it is fundamental. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a pillar of 
the administrative law regime that arose after World War II. The 
APA, the “constitution of the administrative state,” established and 
codified the notice-and-comment procedure for “legislative” or “sub-
stantive” rules—those that are legally binding on agencies and the 
public.63 With the explosive growth of the federal government during 
the 1930s and 1940s, lawmakers realized that “Congress cannot 
                                                                                                                  
ment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights Violations of Arabs and Muslims in 
the United States, 29 VT. L. REV. 407, 411-19 (2005). 
 60. Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence 
Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
365 (2010) (examining social science data regarding the Muslim community in New York 
City and concluding that perceptions of governmental legitimacy are the most important 
incentive to cooperate with counterterrorism efforts). 
 61. Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 55, at 1384 (citing Emily Bazar, New Battle on 
Civil Rights Front—The Registration of Some Immigrants Is Denounced as Racial Profil-
ing, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 20, 2003, at A1; Wyatt Buchanan, Hundreds Protest INS Reg-
istration/Men from 13 Countries Sign In, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2003, at A13). 
 62. Id.; see Suspending the 30-Day and Annual Interview Requirements from the 
Special Registration Process for Certain Nonimmigrants, 68 Fed. Reg. 67,578 (Dec. 2, 
2003); see also Removing Designated Countries from the National Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS), 76 Fed. Reg. 23,830 (Apr. 28, 2011) (formally finalizing 
the abandonment of the program). Under US-VISIT, most visitors are subject to the collec-
tion of biometric data upon entry at air- and seaports. See Implementation of the United 
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (“US-VISIT”); Bio-
metric Requirements, 69 Fed. Reg. 468 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
 63. See Hickman, supra note 17, at 481-82 (discussing the factors courts use to deter-
mine whether a rule is legislative). Because agencies have incentives to avoid notice-and-
comment by labeling rules as merely “interpretive,” even if they really are legislative, 
many courts do not accept agencies’ characterizations at face value. See id.; William Funk, 
Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1023, 1029-30 (2004). 
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manage the regulatory demands of the modern [administrative] state 
on its own.”64 Notice-and-comment rulemaking was one compromise 
under which Congress could delegate to agencies the power to issue 
legally binding rules without abandoning oversight of those agencies. 
The APA also technically requires more robust, “formal,” trial-like 
rulemaking procedures in some circumstances when the agency’s en-
abling act or another statute requires rulemaking “to be made on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”65 However, courts 
have generally given agencies broad discretion in their choice of pro-
cedures and have rarely interpreted statutes as requiring agencies to 
engage in formal rulemaking.66 By the 1970s, with the courts’ bless-
ing, notice-and-comment became the norm for agency rulemaking.67 
In the twenty-first century, it remains the primary means for the 
resolution of policy matters by agencies and continues to enjoy the 
strong endorsement of administrative law scholars.68  
 Under its notice-and-comment procedures, the APA requires 
agencies to publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register and pro-
vide the public with an opportunity to respond during a fixed period, 
which may be as long as 180 days, depending on the rule’s complexi-
ty.69 When issuing a final rule that implements a congressional man-
date, agencies must provide “a concise general statement” of the pro-
posed regulation’s “basis and purpose.”70 The process requires agen-
cies to “specifically explain their policy choices, their consideration of 
important aspects of the problem, and their reasons for not pursuing 
viable alternatives.”71 
 Publication of a proposed rule begins a dialogue between policy-
makers and those affected by a regulation; interested parties must 
                                                                                                                  
 64. See Hathaway, supra note 34, at 243. 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 66. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“The choice made 
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies pri-
marily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); Edward Rubin, It’s Time 
to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 
(2003) (“Because the impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely 
requires this technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the 
rare cases where the statute seems to do so.”). 
 67. See Hickman, supra note 17, at 476-77; Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue 
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
467, 546-59 (2002). 
 68. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 411, 428-29 (2005) (“Notice and comment deserves close attention in a study of regula-
tory democracy because the bulk of regulation is crafted through that procedure today . . . .”); 
Mendelson, supra note 41, at 1380. But see, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Presiden-
tial Control Is Better Than the Alternatives, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 113, 116-17 (2010) 
(describing notice-and-comment as too burdensome). 
 69. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 70. Id. § 553(c). 
 71. Stack, supra note 38, at 972. 
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have the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulation, and the 
agency must respond to the comments.72 Courts enforce these re-
quirements through “hard look” review, invalidating regulations that 
they find to be “arbitrary and capricious,” and upholding regulations 
that are well reasoned and well supported by facts.73  
 The notice-and-comment process has been widely praised for im-
proving agency decisionmaking from a number of different perspec-
tives, many of which are staples of administrative law. No matter 
which of the major theories of agency decisionmaking one adopts, the 
notice-and-comment process arguably adds value. Even from a purely 
“expertocratic” perspective,74 in which the public’s contribution to de-
cisionmaking is considered less important, the notice requirement 
arguably results in better policy because it disciplines agency deci-
sionmaking from the very beginning. It provides incentives for agen-
cy employees to create an accurate record, to communicate with one 
another clearly, to involve the entire agency in the process, and to 
identify and attempt to resolve critical issues before issuing notice of 
the proposed rule.75  
 For those who believe that the involvement of the public is crucial 
for rulemaking to result in good policies, the benefits of notice-and-
comment are more obvious. A public choice or pluralist view regards 
                                                                                                                  
 72. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (enumerating the notice-and-comment requirements); United 
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring re-
sponse to significant comments); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 
392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring disclosure of “technical data or studies” in time to allow 
for meaningful comment). 
 73. Judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of the APA and necessary to en-
force the notice-and-comment requirements. The APA requires reviewing courts to “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted “arbitrary and capricious” review as requiring 
courts to review the record and “satisfy[] themselves that the agency has made a reasoned 
decision based on its evaluation of the significance—or lack of significance—of . . . infor-
mation.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). “Hard look” review 
describes the way the courts enforce the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, so the terms 
are usually considered interchangeable. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Poli-
tics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009).  
 74. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delibera-
tive Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 179 (1997) (“Expertocratic models view 
the decision process primarily as an exercise in scientific validation by virtue of the method 
and culture of the agency experts’ profession.”). 
 75. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE 
L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent 
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
483, 506-10 (1997); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” 
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006) (contending that judicial review of 
agency action disciplines and improves the rulemaking process because “the expert gov-
ernment decisionmaker’s willingness to produce a high-quality explanation” for a rule “sig-
nals that the government believes the benefits of the proposed policy are high,” making 
judicial approval more likely). 
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regulation as the resolution of conflicts among competing interests, 
while a public interest view holds that regulators can discern and 
pursue the general good.76 But from either view, active participation 
of the public matters immensely because rulemaking is an important 
means by which the government resolves not just “technical” or “sci-
entific” questions, but also questions of values.77 Selecting among dif-
ferent potential gains is a value judgment, as Cass Sunstein ob-
served, and one that should be “made publicly and exposed to demo-
cratic view.”78 Moreover, public deliberation and participation can be 
regarded as irreducible democratic values in themselves.79 
 Notice-and-comment rulemaking also strengthens legitimacy. 
Agencies must be held accountable if their actions are to be seen as 
legitimate. Accountability flows from meaningful constraints on 
agency authority.80 Notice-and-comment is a powerful constraint: it 
ensures that agency action is seen as legitimate because it provides 
direct accountability to the public, which means that its choices will 
more closely reflect the popular will. This can be true whether or not 
the process is viewed from a public choice or public interest perspec-
tive. For public choice theorists, if the agency hears from and consid-
ers a wide range of interests, its decisions will be seen as more demo-
cratic: the agency serves as a broker among interest groups, just as 
Congress serves as a broker for interest groups during the enactment 
of legislation.81 From the (more optimistic) public interest perspec-
                                                                                                                  
 76. See Rossi, supra note 74, at 198-99. 
 77. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judi-
cial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 735-36 (2011) (con-
tending that “agency science . . . is laced with policy decisions at numerous levels” and that 
“interested parties and agencies alike are incentivized to cloak their policy choices in the 
seemingly unassailable mantle of science”). 
 78. Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 
364 (1999). 
 79. See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 481, 481-82 (1997) (advancing a “conversational” model of democracy, “under 
which the citizenry is engaged by ongoing public conversation about public policy,” and 
arguing that “it is this engagement that is the stabilizing force in the system”); Rossi,  
supra note 74, at 179. 
 80. See Criddle, supra note 34, at 159 (“[W]hen Congress delegates lawmaking author-
ity to administrative agencies, structural due process requires that agency lawmakers be 
subject to meaningful political accountability and that persons adversely affected by agen-
cy action have an opportunity to test the constitutional adequacy of Congress’s delegation 
through judicial review.”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005) (“[T]rue accountability, in the 
realm of law and politics, involves many of the features that are central to the administra-
tive state and that people find so unattractive about it—hierarchy, monitoring, reporting, 
internal rules, investigations, and job evaluations.”). 
 81. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683 (1975); id. at 1670 (“Increasingly, the function of administra-
tive law is not the protection of private autonomy but the provision of a surrogate politi-
cal process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the 
process of administrative decision.”). 
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tive, the agency rulemaking process is a forum for democratic delib-
eration, in which agencies and citizens alike will change their views 
in response to reasoning of others.82 During the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, both citizens (including interest groups) and the 
agency engage in dialogue. Even if the dialogue is limited by the 
brevity of the comment period, the agency staff can act as agents of 
constituent stakeholders.83  
 In addition to its role in facilitating direct accountability to the 
public, notice-and-comment rulemaking can support and enhance 
congressional oversight of agency action. It is true that, if an agency 
thwarts the public interest, the public can contact their congressional 
representatives and exert pressure through the vote. But this process 
is a lengthy and frustrating one: Congress’s attention span is notori-
ously short, and ordinary congressional oversight through hearings, 
confirmation decisions, and appropriations is limited, infrequent, and 
ad hoc.84 This sort of congressional “walking the beat” is labeled “po-
lice-patrol” oversight by Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 
who criticize it as overlooking many important agency problems.85  
 Notice-and-comment rulemaking can help address this gap by ena-
bling other informal, but complementary, oversight processes. If a 
proposed regulation provokes significant controversy, Congress is 
likely to re-examine the delegation of authority to the agency and in-
tervene in a more timely fashion. In other words, notice-and-comment 
rulemaking permits the public to engage in what McCubbins and 
Schwartz call “fire alarm” oversight.86 Notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing—and subsequent judicial enforcement—“allows Congress to har-
ness the power of private actors to enhance its oversight capacity.”87  
                                                                                                                  
 82. Mark Seidenfeld, The Quixotic Quest for a “Unified” Theory of the Administrative 
State, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.deg 
ruyter.com/view/j/ils.2005.5.issue-1/ils.2005.5.1.1056/ils.2005.5.1.1056.xml?format=INT. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See, e.g., THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 170 (2006) (lamenting 
the infrequency of congressional oversight); Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legis-
lator Preferences and Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 23, 40-41 (2011) (concluding that members of Congress generally assign a low value 
to service on oversight subcomittees); David E. Lewis & Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and 
the Bureaucracy: The Levers of Presidential Control, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 374, 382-85 (Michael Nelson ed., 10th ed. 2014) (arguing that reelec-
tion-oriented legislators have scant incentive to participate in oversight activities). 
 85. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Over-
looked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
 86. See id.  
 87. Hathaway, supra note 34, at 247 n.320; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regula-
tion as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administra-
tive State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 399-408 (2006) (discussing the “administrative accountability 
paradigm”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
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 Although it enjoys broad support, notice-and-comment is certainly 
not without its critics. Notice-and-comment is a time and resource-
intensive process. Indeed, the substantial literature on “agency ossi-
fication” largely blames notice-and-comment requirements for agency 
sluggishness and resistance to change.88 Richard Pierce summarizes 
this critique:  
[I]t takes a long time to issue a rule; agencies never issue many of 
the rules that would be beneficial to the public; agencies maximize 
their use of procedural alternatives that are inferior to rulemaking 
to avoid the delay and cost of the notice-and-comment process; and 
agencies often decline to amend or to rescind rules that have  
become obsolete.89  
These problems may account for a noticeable trend by Congress to-
ward forcing agencies to act without notice-and-comment, either by 
mandating the issuance of particular rules or by imposing deadlines 
that make the procedure impossible.90  
 Nonetheless, notice-and-comment remains the benchmark. And 
despite its drawbacks, it is the least-worst means for achieving better 
policy outcomes and keeping agencies accountable.  
B.   The Constitutional Dimension of Notice-and-Comment 
 The benefits of notice-and-comment rulemaking in advancing 
democratic values are often celebrated. But it has a constitutional di-
mension as well. Congress designed it to be a means through which 
agencies are constrained from exceeding their delegated authority and 
thereby violating separation of powers principles or individual rights. 
 The Constitution, by vesting “[a]ll legislative [p]owers herein 
granted” in Congress, limits Congress’s ability to delegate that power 
to the executive branch or independent agencies.91 The non-
delegation doctrine requires Congress to “ ‘lay down by legislative act 
an intelligible principle to which the [agency] is directed to conform.’ ”92 
                                                                                                                  
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1770 (2007) (“[C]ourts force agencies to comply with the procedures 
that facilitate fire-alarm oversight.”). 
 88. See Pierce, supra note 68, at 116-17 (summarizing the literature on ossification in 
agency rulemaking); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 49 (1993); Thomas O. McGarity, Response, The Courts and 
the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 
525-29 (1997). 
 89. Pierce, supra note 68, at 117. 
 90. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text (discussing use of the “good 
cause” exception). 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 92. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hamp-
ton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Under the Supreme Court’s cur-
rent approach to the non-delegation doctrine, Congress cannot delegate any amount of its 
own actual legislative power but may nonetheless delegate vast “rulemaking” authority to 
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Failure to do so violates constitutional separation of powers princi-
ples. In addition, the agency itself lacks the power to create an “intel-
ligible principle” when Congress has failed to provide one.93  
 It is extremely rare for courts to invoke the non-delegation doc-
trine to strike down legislation as unconstitutional.94 Since 1935, 
courts have bowed to the exigencies of the massive modern adminis-
trative state by permitting Congress to assign vast rulemaking au-
thority to agencies.95 Instead, the courts have trod a different path 
toward regularly enforcing constitutional separation of powers prin-
ciples in administrative law. Through judicial review of agency ac-
tion, courts play a critical role in ensuring that agencies act only 
within the bounds of their constitutionally-valid delegated authority.96  
 In the APA, Congress codified this role for courts, and scholars 
have come to recognize that role’s constitutional dimensions.97 But it 
is a role that courts have been playing for as long as the administra-
tive state has existed.98 The APA empowers courts to set aside agency 
action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law.”99 Courts have further underscored 
the fundamental importance, if not explicitly the constitutional di-
mensions of, APA review by gradually developing more stringent 
standards for reviewing agency action than for review of most stat-
utes.100 Congress originally understood the APA’s arbitrary and ca-
                                                                                                                  
agencies. See id. at 488-89 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority that the 
properly delegated authority is not “legislative”).  
 93. Id. at 472 (majority opinion). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (observing 
that “the limits on delegation are frequently stated, but rarely invoked,” and that “the Su-
preme Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since 1935” (citing 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)).  
 95. See Stack, supra note 38, at 956. 
 96. See id. at 958-59; see also Criddle, supra note 34, at 132. But cf. Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1721 
(2002) (“A statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other agents never effects 
a delegation of legislative power.”). 
 97. See generally Metzger, supra note 100 (describing the “deeply embedded practice” 
of judges’ infus[ing] constitutional values into their development of administrative law 
doctrines or readings of ordinary administrative requirements.”); Stack, supra note 38. 
 98. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1924) (citing precedent that, if not 
presented on the record, express findings by an agency could not “be supplied by implica-
tion” or by reference to litigation documents before the agency and concluding that such a 
defect “goes to the existence of the power on which the proceeding rests” (citing Wichita 
R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48, 59 (1922)); see also Stack, supra note 
38, at 983-89 (discussing Mahler, Wichita Railroad, and similar contemporaneous decisions 
holding that the limitation derived from constitutional concerns). 
 99. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 
(1983) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
 100. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010). 
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pricious standard as equivalent to the “minimal scrutiny [of] consti-
tutional rationality review.”101 Over the years, however, the courts’ 
interpretations of agency action have diverged from their interpreta-
tion of statutes. The APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard became 
gradually more rigorous, evolving into today’s “hard look” review.102 
As Gillian Metzger has recounted, this divergence was driven largely 
by constitutional concerns raised by the expansion of regulatory au-
thority during the 1960s and 1970s with fears of agency capture by 
industry.103 With separation of powers principles at stake, courts 
came to view  agency action with a more skeptical eye.  
 Of course, some may reject the idea that hard look review is a full-
blown constitutional requirement.104 It may be merely a prudential 
doctrine or occupy some quasi-constitutional twilight zone.105 But it is 
difficult to imagine that our massive modern administrative state 
could function in a constitutionally sound manner without the sort of 
judicial scrutiny that hard look review provides. As courts have come 
to interpret it, the APA is, therefore, not merely a constitution for the 
administrative state;106 it provides essential constitutional validity 
for the administrative state. 
 However, unless an agency is required to state its reasoning for 
acting while it takes action, and unless it actually does so, reviewing 
courts cannot perform their constitutionally critical duty to discern 
whether the agency acted for lawful reasons.107 If hard look review 
has constitutional dimensions, the requirement of contemporaneous 
                                                                                                                  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.; Watts, supra note 73, at 15-16. 
 103. Metzger, supra note 100, at 491. 
 104. See, e.g., Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1909, 1921 (2009) (arguing that eliminating the Chenery rule and permitting courts to 
consider post-hoc rationales for agency action would be constitutional and would help ame-
liorate ossification of agency decisionmaking). 
 105. Scholars and jurists have not only likened the APA to a constitution, but they also 
see it as having quasi-constitutional status within the framework of American law. See, 
e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1077 (2004) (“Alt-
hough it is packaged as a statute, the APA is the product of constitutional thought, and the 
courts have given quasi-constitutional status to its provisions.”); Metzger, supra note 100, 
at 484-85 (describing judicial review of administrative action as a form of constitutional 
common law subject to congressional revision).  
 106. Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A 
Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 35 (1996) (describing the APA as “the constitution 
of the modern regulatory state”); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) 
(characterizing the APA as a “seminal act” governing the relationship between courts  
and agencies). 
 107. See, e.g., Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1565 (10th Cir. 
1994) (setting aside an agency decision because the court could not “ascertain” from a thor-
ough review of the administrative record the basis and support for the decision). The court 
explained that “the grounds upon which the agency acted must be clearly disclosed in, and 
sustained by, the record,” and that “[t]he agency must make plain its course of inquiry, its 
analysis and its reasoning.” Id. at 1575 (citation omitted). 
902  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:883 
 
reason-giving by the agency would therefore have constitutional  
dimensions as well.108  
 Recognizing the fundamental importance of this requirement even 
prior to the APA’s enactment, the Supreme Court established the 
Chenery rule to test the validity of any agency’s exercise of discre-
tion.109 In Chenery I, the Court held that discretionary administrative 
action will only be upheld on grounds articulated by the agency in the 
record.110 This is in marked contrast to judicial review of statutes: 
unless strict scrutiny is required, courts may uphold legislation on 
any constitutional basis—even one Congress never articulated.111 In 
establishing the Chenery rule, therefore, the Court identified a key 
difference between the way courts should evaluate legislation and the 
way they should evaluate agency action.  
 The Chenery rule delimits the responsibilities and powers of agen-
cies and courts in the judicial review process in a manner animated 
by, and sensitive to, separation of powers concerns.112 It preserves in 
agencies the formal authority to exercise the discretion delegated by 
Congress, preventing courts from substituting their own policy for 
that of the agency. At the same time, however, the rule limits agency 
power to make policy away from public scrutiny. 
 The Chenery rule also helps promote integrated and cohesive deci-
sionmaking within agencies. Knowing that courts will privilege those 
agency rationales proffered at the time of the agency decision and in 
the record—rather than often ad-hoc justifications by staff or counsel 
off the record, before the agency process officially begins, or during 
judicial review—senior agency officials have incentives to exercise 
control over staff and counsel, focusing the agency’s attention on the 
most persuasive, rational, and legally supportable justifications for 
the action. Chenery I has helped make “explicit reason-giving a major 
part of the industry of the administrative state.”113  
 For courts, in turn, “an agency’s contemporaneous explanation for 
its decisions remains one of the most common grounds for judicial 
reversal and remand.”114 As Kevin Stack has observed, courts treat 
an agency’s failure to articulate the right reasons for its decision as a 
                                                                                                                  
 108. Metzger, supra note 100, at 491-93; Stack, supra note 38, at 1003-04. But see Note, 
Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the Fact, supra note 104, at 1921. 
 109. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).  
 110. Id. at 87-88. 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 88; Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (stating the well-
settled principle that “if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the 
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason”). 
 112. Stack, supra note 38, at 957-58. 
 113. Id. at 957. 
 114. Id.  
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constitutional error.115 The Chenery rule helps enforce the non-
delegation doctrine.  
 The notice-and-comment requirements work hand-in-hand with 
Chenery I to ensure that agency rulemaking remains within constitu-
tionally permissible bounds. That is why exceptions to notice-and-
comment requirements are constitutionally problematic. Without a 
requirement that agencies articulate and test their rationales during 
the decisionmaking process, the courts may have difficulty discerning 
which rationales the agency actually relied upon in making its deci-
sion. This significantly weakens the courts’ ability to enforce the 
Chenery rule and with it, the non-delegation doctrine. Just as the no-
tice-and-comment procedures have constitutional roots and a consti-
tutional dimension, the exceptions to those procedures, too, must 
have some other constitutional justification. 
C.   Secrecy and the National Security Exception 
 As I will discuss further below, the APA provides several excep-
tions enabling agencies to disregard the notice-and-comment re-
quirements, despite their importance. But the APA establishes only 
two substantive exceptions from notice-and-comment requirements.116 
The first is an exception for “matter[s] relating to agency manage-
ment or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts.”117 The first portion of this exception, respecting internal 
agency matters, is relatively easy to justify because these matters 
affect the public only indirectly.118 But the second portion is contro-
versial in its own right: rules regarding public property, loans, 
grants, benefits, and contracts undoubtedly have the potential to 
substantially affect millions of Americans directly. Courts and com-
                                                                                                                  
 115. Id. at 983-84. 
 116. Not all departures from, or additions to, notice-and-comment rulemaking stand-
ards are found in the APA. An agency’s organic statute or other procedural statute may 
provide for more or fewer requirements. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006) (mandating thorough scientific and system-
atic analysis of environmental problems in rulemaking and imposing procedural require-
ments to generate information for the agency and the public). 
 117. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012). 
 118. Compare Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the exception did not apply to the purported repeal by Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board (MSPB) of a regulation governing removal of administrative law judges because 
the rule implicated a broader interest of the public in having private rights adjudicated by 
persons who had some independence from the agency that opposed them), with Favreau v. 
United States, 317 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the exception applied to 
memoranda detailing when the United States could seek recoupment of prepaid bonuses 
from armed forces personnel). 
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mentators expressed puzzlement,119 and the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States recommended that this portion of the ex-
ception be eliminated.120 Subsequent agency-specific statutes and 
regulations have considerably constrained its scope.121  
 The second substantive exception is the national security excep-
tion, which, unlike its ill-fated twin, is alive and well. It is an expres-
sion of, if not the foundation of, the national security administrative 
state. If the proposed rule involves a “foreign affairs” or “military” 
function of the United States, the agency may disregard the APA’s 
requirements for notice, comment, and delay in rule implementation.122 
 This is not the only way in which the framework of U.S. adminis-
trative law provides national security exceptions. Classification au-
thority enables agencies to avoid notice-and-comment by keeping a 
portion, or the entire existence, of rulemaking secret.123 And the APA 
itself includes other exceptions for national security agency action. 
Importantly, agencies are also exempt from the adjudication re-
quirements when conducting a foreign affairs or military function.124 
And although the APA usually applies to military departments and 
agencies, it does not apply at all to military commissions, courts mar-
tial, or to “military authority exercised in the field in time of war or 
in occupied territory.”125  
 Moreover, Executive Order 12,866, which establishes, over all U.S. 
government agency rulemaking, centralized review by the Office of 
                                                                                                                  
 119. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Snow, 561 F.2d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he APA [con-
tracts exception] does create a serious gap in the procedural protections the APA was  
enacted to provide.”). 
 120. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to 
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 611 (1970).  
 121. See, e.g., Elimination of Certain Exceptions from the APA Rulemaking Require-
ments, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1974) (detailing 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) rules pertaining to “ ‘public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts’ ”); see also United States v. AEY, Inc., 603 F. 
Supp. 2d 1363, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Pierce, supra note 68, at 116. The exception is still 
invoked, however, for a small percentage of rules. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND 
TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 8, 15 (2012) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 122. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). 
 123. For a list of the key statutes providing authority to classify information, see supra 
note 12. The President also engages in national security rulemaking directly through a 
variety of different types of executive orders, which are usually published in the Federal 
Register, and National Security Decision Directives (which go by many different names), 
which are usually not. See STEPHEN DYCUS, ET. AL, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 40-41 (5th  
ed. 2011). 
 124. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4). Discussion of the adjudication exception is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it raises many, if not most, of the same problems as the rulemaking exception. 
 125. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(F)–(G). For an analysis of the military authority exception and a 
compelling argument that it should be narrowly construed, see Kathryn E. Kovacs, A His-
tory of the Military Authority Exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 673 (2010). 
2014]  NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 905  
 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), echoes the APA by exempting “[r]egulations 
or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States, other than procurement regulations and regulations 
involving the import or export of non-defense articles and services.”126 
By virtue of the exceptions in the APA and Executive Order 12,866, 
national security rulemaking is not subject to other statutory and 
regulatory requirements, the goal of which is to keep agencies ac-
countable to the public and policymakers. For example, many nation-
al security rules are not included in the publication of the “Unified 
Agenda,” which is intended to be a central database of current agency 
rulemaking throughout the U.S. government.127 Nor are agencies re-
quired to conduct periodic review of existing national security regula-
tions under the Regulatory Flexibility Act or conduct cost-benefit 
analyses when they engage in national security rulemaking.128 
 But in our administrative law’s web of national security excep-
tionalism, the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking exception 
stands out because it applies to every agency, in times of war and 
peace. And it does the most work to strip national security rulemak-
ing of the key features that are believed to ensure democratic ac-
countability, transparency, and legitimacy.  
 A lack of available data makes it difficult to establish how often 
the national security exception has actually been used by agencies to 
disregard the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. A 1969 
survey of agencies by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States revealed that “[i]n practice, . . . most agencies do not usually 
exercise their discretion to follow the [notice-and-comment] require-
ments . . . when they are not bound to do so because the rule-making 
involves a ‘military or foreign affairs function.’ ”129 Most revealing 
was the response by the Department of Defense (DoD), which seemed 
                                                                                                                  
 126. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
601. The OIRA review process was established by this Executive Order under the Clinton 
Administration. The Order was revised under the Bush Administration, but the Obama 
Administration restored the original language. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 
(Feb. 4, 2009).  
 127. The Unified Agenda is maintained by the Regulatory Information Center in the 
OIRA. See Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory 
Actions, 77 Fed. Reg. 7664, 7665 (Feb. 13, 2012) (“Executive Order 12866 does not require 
agencies to include [in the Unified Agenda] regulations concerning military or foreign affairs 
functions or regulations related to agency organization, management, or personnel matters.”). 
The Unified Agenda is available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain. 
 128. These requirements are only triggered by the notice-and-comment process. See, e.g., 
Airports of Entry or Departure for Flights to and from Cuba, CUSTOMS BULL. & DECISIONS, 
Feb. 2011, at 1, 5 (observing that, because the national security exception relieved the 
Commerce Department from conducting notice-and-comment, the “Department does not 
consider this document to be subject to the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act”). 
 129. Bonfield, supra note 22, at 232.  
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to have concluded that it was exempt entirely from notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements. When asked how often it relied 
on the specific exception for “military functions,” and how often it re-
lied on the other substantive exceptions for “foreign affairs,” “agency 
management or personnel,” “public property,” or “contracts,” the De-
partment replied that “ ‘[i]n a fundamental sense all regulations and 
directives of the Department are incident to its essentially military 
function of national defense.’ ”130 The State Department estimated 
that forty percent of its rules fit within the exception.131  
 However, during the mid-1970s, following the Vietnam War and 
Watergate, when Congress and the public heavily scrutinized the ac-
tivities of military and intelligence agencies and proposals for sweep-
ing legislative reform were in the air, DoD changed its tune.132 In re-
sponse to proposals by the Administrative Conference of the United 
States that the national security exception be eliminated,133 DoD in 
1975 issued regulations to “voluntarily adopt procedures for public 
participation in rulemaking having direct and substantial public im-
pact.”134 Through 2005, the announced Department policy was to use 
notice-and-comment procedures for such rules “unless it [was] deter-
mined by the DoD Component as a matter within its sole and exclu-
sive prerogative that the employment of the exception or exemption 
[was] appropriate to satisfy a significant and legitimate interest of 
the DoD Component or the public.”135 This language, which was pub-
lished in the Code of Federal Regulations, obviously still left the De-
partment plenty of flexibility to avoid notice-and-comment.  
 In 2006, the Department undertook further reforms designed to 
regularize the use of notice-and-comment. It removed the rule from 
the Code of Federal Regulations and adopted a new Administrative 
Instruction (AI 102) generally requiring the Department “Compo-
nents” to comply with all rulemaking requirements that would apply 
                                                                                                                  
 130. Id. at 239 (quoting House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 85th Cong., Survey and 
Study of Administration, Organization, Procedure and Practice in the Federal Agencies 278 
(Comm. Print 1957)).  
 131. See id. at 261. 
 132. See Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of 
Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 78, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/lr/vol2014/iss1/3 (observing that revelations in the ear-
ly 1970s about widespread national security-related abuses of power forced the nation “into 
a national dialogue about the constitutional boundaries of executive power . . . and the 
appropriateness of domestic intelligence gathering”). 
 133. Elimination of the “Military or Foreign Affairs Function” Exemption from APA 
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1975). 
 134. 40 Fed. Reg. 4911 (Feb. 3, 1975). The most recent version of this rule, valid 
through 2005, is codified at 32 C.F.R. § 336.3. 
 135. 32 C.F.R. § 336.3. The regulation was superseded by U.S. Dep’t of Defense Admin-
istrative Instruction 102 and removed from the Federal Register in 2006. See Removal of 
Parts, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,280, 12,281 (Mar. 10, 2006).  
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to non-military or foreign affairs functions when the rules would 
have an impact on the public in certain ways.136 Specifically, AI 102 
requires the Department to follow notice-and-comment procedures 
when a rule “[i]s presently in the CFR”; “[g]rants a right or privilege 
to the public or has a direct or substantial impact on any significant 
portion of the public (e.g., visitors allowed to tour the Pentagon)”; 
“[p]rescribes a course of conduct that must be followed by persons 
outside the Government to avoid a penalty or secure a right or privi-
lege (e.g., behavior when visiting the Pentagon)”; “[c]onstitutes au-
thority for persons outside the Government to act or secure immunity 
from the consequence of not acting (e.g., security officers)”; “[i]mposes 
an obligation on the general public or members of a class of persons 
outside the Government (e.g., charges to reside at a dwelling owned 
by DoD)”; “[d]escribes where the public may obtain information, in-
structions, and forms; make submittals or requests; take examina-
tions; or obtain decisions (e.g., Web site information)”; or “[d]escribes 
procedures by which a DoD Component conducts its business with 
the public (e.g., financial institutions on DoD installations).”137  
 These changes reduced the need for DoD to rely on the national 
security exception. But they did not necessarily make DoD more 
transparent. In imposing these requirements, DoD was careful to ex-
clude rules that “pertain[] to a military or foreign affairs function of 
the United States determined to require a security classification in 
the interests of national defense or foreign policy under the criteria of 
an E.O. or statute (e.g., foreign military sales).”138  
 Even though DoD’s changes increased transparency with respect 
to certain types of rulemaking, the trend toward increased secrecy 
pushed other types of rulemaking further into the shadows. Over-
classification of national security information has been a serious 
problem for decades, despite attempts at reform. In the decade after 
September 11, the number of government employees and contractors 
with security clearances and the number of documents—including 
agency rules—that were subject to some form of classification grew 
dramatically.139 Moreover, similar voluntary notice-and-comment 
procedures were not adopted by other agencies, such as the National 
Security Agency or the Departments of State, Treasury, or Homeland 
Security, that engage in a significant amount of national security 
rulemaking directly affecting American citizens.  
                                                                                                                  
 136. WASH. HEADQUARTERS SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Administrative Instruction 102 
(2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/a102p.pdf. 
 137. Id. §§ E3.2.1–E.3.2.1.7. 
 138. Id. § E3.2.2.4. 
 139. See PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 24, at 86-87. 
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 In fact, the Federal Register contains relatively few specific invo-
cations of the national security exception by agencies.140 The most 
commonly found examples are from the Commerce and Treasury De-
partments, which seem to invoke the exception rather regularly when 
issuing regulations regarding trade matters.141 For reasons I discuss 
below, however, agencies often rely on the exception without indicat-
ing that they are doing so.  
 It is not uncommon for agencies to issue rules without notice-and-
comment for a number of reasons. For one thing, the rules may be 
merely interpretive and non-legally binding “policy statements.”142 
The APA also exempts “rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.”143 Even for substantive rules, moreover, the APA contains a 
key exception from notice-and-comment requirements for when there 
is “good cause” on the ground that such requirements would be “im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”144 The 
“good cause” exception is by far the one most commonly invoked by 
agencies during the rulemaking process to justify disregarding the 
notice-and-comment procedures for legislative rules.145  
 A dearth of accessible data or empirical studies makes it difficult 
to get an accurate picture of agency rulemaking in general.146 But se-
crecy and opacity make national security rulemaking especially 
tricky to track. Anne Joseph O’Connell constructed the first extensive 
database of rulemaking activities reported by agencies between 1983 
and 2003.147 Analyzing this data, O’Connell concluded that the agen-
                                                                                                                  
 140. A search of the Federal Register yielded 2370 results suggesting an explicit invo-
cation of the national security exception by agencies during the rulemaking process since 
1981. The following query was used: (((“military” /6 “function”) or (“foreign affairs” /6 “func-
tion”)) /p (“rulemaking” or “rule”)). However, this is a very rough measure of the number of 
rules for which the exception was invoked. The number may be much lower because agen-
cies typically issue more than one publication regarding the same rule. See Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Adminis-
trative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 925 n.104 (2008). 
 141. See, e.g., Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations: Implementation 
of Limited Syria Waiver for Reconstruction Assistance, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,972 (July 23, 2013) 
(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 736, 746). 
 142. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 144. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B). 
 145. See GAO REPORT, supra note 121, at 19.  
 146. For key exceptions, see generally Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemak-
ing Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2007) (reporting results by the au-
thor of the first empirical study of Treasury’s APA compliance); O’Connell, supra note 140, 
at 895 (analyzing trends using the first extensive database on agency rulemaking activities 
between 1983–2003, constructed by the author from agencies’ semi-annual reports). 
 147. The construction of this database was a major accomplishment because it required 
identifying and consolidating numerous agency documents concerning each rule. 
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cies issuing the greatest percentage of their rules without notice-and-
comment were, in order, the Department of State (49.4%), the De-
partment of Homeland Security (46.2%), the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) (42.3%), the Department of Defense (37.6%), 
NASA (36.5%), and the Department of Justice (34.2%).148 With the 
exception of the OPM (whose rules are likely to fall under other APA 
exceptions), these agencies happen to be the most likely to engage in 
opaque national security rulemaking.149  
 In December 2012, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported 
that it had examined a sample of published rules issued by agencies 
between 2003 and 2010, and that “agencies published about 35 per-
cent of major rules and about 44 percent of nonmajor rules” without 
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) required by the APA.150 
The lack of an NPRM generally indicates that the agency issued the 
rule without following the notice-and-comment requirements, either by 
failing to solicit or consider comments at all or by soliciting comments 
only after the rule had taken effect (an “interim-final” rule). Approxi-
mately seventy-seven percent of the time this happened for major rules, 
the GAO reported, the agency relied on the “good cause” exception.151  
 The frequency with which the good cause exception is used may 
seem to suggest that agencies need not rely on the national security 
exception if they wish to avoid notice-and-comment. Indeed, observ-
ing recent use of the “good cause” exception, one scholar has argued 
that it is being exercised by agencies “with increasing and troubling 
frequency that indicates a casual disregard of public participation.”152  
 However, the GAO report demonstrates that something else is at 
work. In fact, by far the most common reason why agencies rely on 
the “good cause” exception is because they have no choice: Congress 
has either mandated issuance of the rule or imposed a strict deadline 
that does not give the agency enough time to conduct notice-and-
comment rulemaking. The most common reasons cited by agencies 
for invoking this exception were that (1) another statute or court or-
der required the agency to act before it had time to conduct the no-
tice-and-comment procedure; (2) another statute directly prescribed 
the content of the rule; or (3) the agency was responding to an emer-
                                                                                                                  
 148. O’Connell, supra note 121, at 934. 
 149. Many other agencies, like the NSA, will have a larger percentage of their rules 
falling into the national security exception, but most such rules remain secret and would 
not be reflected in O’Connell’s study results. See supra notes 2-17 and accompanying text. 
 150. See GAO REPORT, supra note 121, at 8. A “major” rule is “one that, among other 
things, has resulted in or is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 mil-
lion or more.” See id. at 7. 
 151. See id. at 15. 
 152. Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal 
Agency Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3343 (2013). 
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gency.153 In contrast, of the 123 rules issued without an NPRM that 
the GAO Report examined, only two, by the Departments of Home-
land Security and Commerce, specifically invoked the national secu-
rity exception.154 
 While the GAO Report provides a useful overall picture of the fre-
quency with which agencies avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking 
for many types of rules, it is much less useful for revealing how often 
agencies avoid the procedures on the ground that the rules substan-
tively fall within the national security exception. For one thing, given 
the vast number of agencies that conduct national security-related 
regulation, it is quite probable that a great deal of substantive rule-
making by federal agencies happens in secret, justified on legal 
grounds that never see the light of day or by the statutes that permit 
important government information—even rulemaking—to be kept 
secret.155 Therefore, with the explosion in the use of this classification 
by agencies in the past decade, there could be thousands of un-
published rules—which still have the force of law—that will not turn 
up in a search of the Federal Register and would not have been cap-
tured in the GAO Report.156 
 One prominent example of secret substantive rulemaking is the 
development and implementation of Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) for airport passenger screening by the Transportation Securi-
ty Administration (TSA), an agency in the Department of Homeland 
Security. Although most members of the public are directly affected 
by these rules, and they implicate constitutional rights, they are gen-
erally not available to the public.157 After significant public criticism 
and a lawsuit by privacy advocates, the D.C. Circuit held in 2011 
that the TSA must use notice-and-comment rulemaking in promul-
gating rules for the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) at air-
                                                                                                                  
 153. GAO REPORT, supra note 121, at 16. 
 154. Changes to the Visa Waiver Program to Implement the Electronic System for 
Travel Authorization (ESTA) Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,440, 32,444 (June 9, 2008); Revi-
sions and Technical Correction to the Export Administration Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 
20,221, 20,222 (Apr. 24, 2007) (making several corrections to the Export Administration 
Regulations regarding Libya and terrorist-supporting countries). 
 155. For examples of statutes that authorize secret rulemaking, see supra note 23. 
 156. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of rampant 
over-classification). “Unpublished” rules are not necessarily secret or unavailable to the 
public. They are often a form of opaque rulemaking signaled in various forms in agency 
communications, such as policy manuals, that may eventually be released. 
 157. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (“Congress generally has left it to the agency to prescribe the details of the screening 
process, which the TSA has documented in a set of Standard Operating Procedures not 
available to the public.”). Some of the SOPs were inadvertently published online in 2009. 
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-10-37, TSA’S BREACH 
OF SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION (2010), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/ 
assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-37_Jan10.pdf.  
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ports, although it permitted the current rules to remain in place.158 
Although the D.C. Circuit rejected the TSA’s arguments that the 
rules were exempt, the agency did not rely on the national security 
exception.159 In March 2013, the TSA issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on AIT, beginning the notice-and-comment process.160  
 But the most important factor that makes national security rule-
making difficult to track is that the APA’s national security exception 
is a unique card that can be played by an agency at any point. In 
stark contrast to the use of the “good cause” exception, courts simply 
have not required agencies eschewing the notice-and-comment pro-
cess to invoke the national security exception as their reason for do-
ing so contemporaneously with the issuance of the rule. In other 
words, an agency may fail to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures without explaining why, but it may subsequently rely on 
the national security exception when the rule is challenged in 
court.161 Even when agencies do invoke the exception when issuing a 
rule, they have not been required by courts to provide any justifica-
tion for why the exception applies.162  
 Since the APA was enacted, federal courts have discussed the na-
tional security exception in approximately one hundred cases.163 In 
approximately seventy-six of those cases, the court weighed the ap-
plicability of the exception, even though the agency had not invoked 
the exception during the rulemaking process and was apparently re-
lying on the exception for the first time. In about sixty-two of those 
cases, the court concluded that the exception applied; in about four-
teen cases, the court held that the exception did not apply and that 
the agency had therefore violated the APA. In stark contrast, if an 
agency does not invoke the “good cause” exception during the rule-
                                                                                                                  
 158. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 6 (holding that, because an AIT scanner produces 
“an image of the unclothed passenger,” it “intrudes upon his or her personal privacy in a way a 
magnetometer does not,” and that this “change substantively affects the public to a degree 
sufficient to implicate the policy interests animating notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
 159. See id. at 5.  
 160. See Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 
18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013). 
 161. See, e.g., City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 
F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the exception applied to the State Department’s 
regulation, despite the Department’s failure to invoke the exception during rulemaking or 
in the final rule); Designation and Determination Under the Foreign Missions Act, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 31,788 (July 2, 2009). 
 162. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting petitioners’ 
assertion that “the foreign affairs exception is inapplicable because the regulation itself did 
not contain a statement of the undesirable international consequences flowing from the 
application of notice and comment review” and concluding that there is “no requirement 
that the rule itself state the undesirable consequences”). 
 163. These numbers, calculated from my searches on Westlaw and Lexis, are approxi-
mate because it is not always clear whether the national security exception was necessary 
for the court’s decision in a particular case. 
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making process and provide justification for invoking it, in most cas-
es the agency will not be permitted to rely on the “good cause” excep-
tion in court.164 The courts’ practice of permitting agencies to rely on 
the national security exception in this manner is plainly inconsistent 
with the Chenery rule, under which courts will uphold agency action 
only on the grounds upon which the agency relied when it acted.165  
 Given that much of national security rulemaking happens “in the 
shadows” and that the agencies themselves are not normally provid-
ing contemporaneous reasons why the national security exception 
applies, courts have failed to offer clear guidance about the appropri-
ate scope of the exception.166 Anything beyond a superficial discussion 
can be found in just a handful of cases.  
 What is most well established is that the exception applies to in-
ternational executive agreements that have the force of law.167 Simi-
larly, regulations implementing treaties are almost always regarded 
as falling within the exception.168 In one of the earliest cases applying 
it, the Second Circuit determined that the FCC acted lawfully when 
it eschewed notice-and-comment procedure in promulgating, pursu-
ant to a treaty with Canada, a regulation that reduced the rights of 
U.S. AM radio broadcasters.169 In 1994, the Department of Transpor-
tation relied on the national security exception to defeat a legal chal-
lenge by the Teamsters Union to a rule, enacted pursuant to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) without notice-and-
comment, exempting Mexican truckers operating in the United 
States from complying with U.S. motor vehicle laws.170  
 In the 1980s, the Court of International Trade attempted to dis-
cern the limits of the exception by analyzing the APA’s legislative 
history and the AG Manual.171 Looking to the purpose of the rules 
under review rather than the agency issuing them, the court con-
cluded that the exception applied to rules “ ‘clearly and directly in-
                                                                                                                  
 164. See, e.g., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co., Div. of Carlisle Corp. v. United States, 10 Ct. 
Int’l Trade 301, 306 (1986). 
 165. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1112. 
 167. Hathaway, supra note 34, at 221 (noting that, because of the national security 
exception, “international agreements are not subject to the same notice and comment rule-
making procedures that apply to nearly every other administrative rule and regulation issued 
by the U.S. government” and that “no alternative oversight mechanism stands in its place”). 
 168. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peña, 17 F.3d 1478, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am. 
Ass’n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Grp. v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985); Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 574 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995); 
Am. Inst. for Imp. Steel, Inc. v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 204, 211 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984). 
 169. See WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 170. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 17 F.3d at 1486. 
 171. Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 214, 229-32 (1984) (noting that courts 
in prior cases had not attempted to identify a limiting principle for the exception). 
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volved’ in a ‘foreign affairs function,’ ”172 which extended to rules by 
the U.S. Customs Service negotiated with foreign governments,173 but 
not to rules by the Commerce Department establishing when a 
dumping margin was regarded as “de minimis” for determining coun-
tervailing duties in dumping investigations.174 
 But it has not been necessary for the agency to be regulating pur-
suant to an international agreement for the exception to apply. In-
stead, it has been enough that a court perceive that the rulemaking 
process would interfere with international negotiations or result in 
retaliation against the United States by other countries. For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit held in 2010 that the exception applied to a 
State Department decision to abruptly cut short a long-running dis-
pute between New York City and two nations’ foreign missions to the 
United Nations.175 The city had maintained that, while the mission 
offices were not taxable, the adjacent residences of mission employees 
were.176 When two of the missions brought suit to challenge the tax, 
the federal district court had agreed that, under relevant treaty pro-
visions, the residences were taxable.177 While the missions appealed, 
the State Department acted swiftly, issuing a regulation, without no-
tice or comment, declaring that such residences were not taxable and 
preempting all local and state laws.178 The Second Circuit upheld the 
regulation and agreed that the national security exception applied, 
even though the State Department had not invoked it when issuing 
the rule.179  
 Apart from the context of international agreements, courts are 
more likely to hold that the national security exception applies when 
the court perceives that notice-and-comment would cause “definitely 
undesirable international consequences,”180 the rulemaking is a re-
sponse to a crisis with foreign affairs implications, or military opera-
tions are involved. None of these factors were present when a court 
held that the exception did not apply to Energy Department regula-
tions governing civilian contractors at facilities where nuclear explo-
sives were manufactured.181 Similarly, some courts have rejected the 
                                                                                                                  
 172. Id. at 231 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 257 (1946)). 
 173. Id. at 228.  
 174. See Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co., Div. of Carlisle Corp. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int’l 
Trade 301, 305-06 (1986). 
 175. See City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 F.3d 
172, 201 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 176. Id. at 174-75. 
 177. Id. at 176.  
 178. Id. at 178.  
 179. Id. at 201. 
 180. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 181. Indep. Guard Ass’n, Local No. 1 v. O’Leary, 57 F.3d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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applicability of the exception in a few immigration contexts. For ex-
ample, one court held that rulemaking regarding administrative de-
tention of Haitian refugees did not fall within the exception, although 
the INS was responding to a crisis, because nothing in the record 
supported a finding that notice-and-comment rulemaking would have 
resulted in “undesirable international consequences.”182 However, 
multiple courts held that the national security exception applied to 
rules tightening restrictions on Iranian nationals in the wake of the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1980.183 And courts have held that the excep-
tion applies to the designation by the military of “temporary security 
zone[s]” such as the weapons testing site near Vieques in Puerto Rico.184  
 Although the cases addressing the exception are rare, they do 
suggest that its applicability, if not always its application, is broad. 
Due to the secrecy and opacity of agency decisionmaking in these ar-
eas, it is difficult to tell whether agencies are, sub silentio, relying on 
the exception, or whether they are simply following a past practice of 
failing to comply with the APA. Either way, national security rule-
making takes place within an administrative culture that eschews 
notice-and-comment and does not value public participation or ac-
countability. In the remainder of this Article, I discuss whether na-
tional security rulemaking should be different and why. 
III.   THE SCHMITTIAN VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 
 As Part II explained, the national security exception is not the on-
ly way in which agencies are authorized—by the APA itself or other 
statutes—to depart from notice-and-comment procedures when issu-
ing rules that have the force of law. What is special about the excep-
tion is the way in which it categorically separates one substantive 
area of rulemaking from all others.185 If one examined only the legis-
lative history of the bill that became the APA, one could conclude 
that the decision to carve out this exception was simply based on ac-
cepted, if unexpressed, assumptions about the exceptional nature of 
national security rulemaking.186 
                                                                                                                  
 182. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated and rev’d on 
other grounds en banc, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
 183. See Nademi v. INS, 679 F.2d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 1982); Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 
F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 184. United States v. Ventura-Melendez, 321 F.3d 230, 232 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 185. The other substantive exception is for government grants and contracts, and it has 
been narrowed significantly by subsequent statutes and regulations. See supra notes 119-
121 and accompanying text.  
 186. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG. (Comm. Print 1945), 
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS, 
1944–46, at 15, 17 (1946) (referring to the exception as “self-explanatory”); infra notes 218-
224 and accompanying text. 
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 Indeed, this is probably the accepted view. Professor Adrian Ver-
meule has recently argued that the entire corpus of American admin-
istrative law, from authorizing statutes to court decisions, allows 
agencies to transcend the bounds of administrative procedure and 
meaningful judicial review in emergencies.187 Vermeule identifies the 
national security exception as one example of a number of such 
“black holes” created by the APA and other statutes—areas where 
the executive may operate free of legal constraints.188 In addition, 
Vermeule contends that administrative law contains numerous “grey 
holes”—ambiguous legal provisions that provide courts opportunities 
to indulge their natural tendency to give heightened deference to 
agencies during national crises.189 Within these grey holes, courts can 
preserve the pretense of the rule of law while deferring entirely to 
the executive.190 
 In articulating this thesis, Vermeule embraced the controversial 
theories of German political scientist Carl Schmitt, “ ‘the outstanding 
legal theorist of the . . . exception.’ ”191 Schmitt’s theories have de-
scriptive and normative aspects. He is well known for his assertion 
that the “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception.”192 However, 
Schmitt not only argued that this phenomenon is inevitable; he con-
cluded that it is necessary for the state’s survival.193 Moreover, as 
Schmitt developed his theories, the exception took on greater and 
greater importance, and Schmitt ultimately argued against limiting 
the sovereign’s discretion at all.194 Because “[t]he precise details of an 
emergency cannot be anticipated” in advance, Schmitt argued, the 
“sovereign” must enjoy absolute freedom both to determine “whether 
there is an . . . emergency” and “what must be done to eliminate it.”195 
 Vermeule takes from Schmitt that an administrative legal regime 
replete with black and grey holes is inevitable. It is “hopelessly uto-
pian,” Vermeule argues, to attempt to apply meaningful administra-
                                                                                                                  
 187. Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1096-97; see also Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in 
the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1271 (2010). 
 188. Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1096. 
 189. Id.  
 190. See id. at 1114. Vermeule was using and responding to the concept of grey holes 
and black holes used by David Dyzenhaus. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2006). 
 191. Gross, supra note 44, at 1826 (emphasis omitted) (quoting HANS KELSEN & CARL 
SCHMITT, A JUXTAPOSITION 10 (Dan Diner & Michael Stolleis eds., 1999)). 
 192. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 5 
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
 193. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 12 (Ellen Kennedy 
trans., MIT Press 1985) (1923); David Dyzenhaus, Emergency, Liberalism, and the State, 9 
PERSP. ON POL. 69, 72 (2011). 
 194. See Gross, supra note 44, at 1841. 
 195. SCHMITT, supra note 192, at 6-7. 
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tive law constraints during emergencies: “The exception cannot, real-
istically, be banished from administrative law; exceptions are neces-
sarily built into its fabric.”196 Vermeule is less clear about whether 
this state of affairs is a desirable one.197 
 While Vermeule is almost certainly correct that exceptions cannot 
be banished entirely from administrative law, critics have disagreed 
with his contention that courts in fact do practice the sort of absolute 
deference he identifies.198 They have also argued that administrative 
law can be reformed to reduce the ability of the executive to act with-
out constraint during emergencies—for example, by altering the na-
ture of the exceptions,199 changing the culture of agencies and courts 
to encourage consideration of “public-regarding factors,”200 or creating 
a more detailed legal framework for emergency administration.201 
 It is no coincidence that interest in Schmitt, on the part of legal 
scholars, has exploded in the decade following the September 11 at-
tacks and the resulting global war against Al Qaeda and the Tali-
ban.202 Schmitt’s core observation that states of exception must exist 
in liberal democracies is an intuitively powerful one. Although 
Schmitt’s views have recently found more sympathy among conserva-
tive scholars, their influence—even if Schmitt himself is not men-
tioned—is something to be reckoned with. Nearly every theorist seri-
ously addressing emergency or war governance after September 11 
has found it necessary to grapple with the Schmittian perspective.203  
 It is also no coincidence that Schmitt developed his theories dur-
ing a period of acute crisis in his native Germany during the 1920s 
                                                                                                                  
 196. Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1097, 1104. 
 197. Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L 
SECURITY J. 283, 429 (2011) (observing that a “problem with Vermeule’s approach is the 
extent to which it blurs empirical conclusions with normative arguments”). 
 198. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 187, at 1274, 1275 & n.20. 
 199. See id. at 1272; David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency In-
side or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2026 (2006). 
 200. Criddle, supra note 187, at 1272. 
 201. See Ackerman, supra note 105, at 1030-31, 1044 (proposing “a newly fashioned 
emergency regime” that permits “short-term emergency measures but draws the line 
against permanent restrictions” to “rescue the concept” of emergency power “from fascist 
thinkers like Carl Schmitt, who used it as a battering ram against liberal democracy”). 
 202. See DUDZIAK, supra note 44, at 116 (observing that “[c]itations to Schmitt in legal 
scholarship steadily increased” after September 11, with “twenty-four citations to Schmitt 
in 2001, twenty-nine in 2002, fifty-one 2003, and eighty-six in 2009”); David Luban, Carl 
Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457, 463 (2010). Interest 
in Schmitt had already been gaining steam prior to September 11. See D.A. Jeremy Tel-
man, Should We Read Carl Schmitt Today?, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 127, 129 (2001)  
(book review). 
 203. See DUDZIAK, supra note 44, at 116-18 (discussing responses to Schmitt among 
legal scholars).  
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and 1930s.204 Schmitt witnessed the perceived weakness of the demo-
cratic Weimar government and saw it collapse with Hitler’s rise to 
power.205 Schmitt himself became a Nazi Party member, and the ex-
tent to which he justified the exploitation of legal loopholes that ena-
bled the rise of the Third Reich is the subject of intense debate.206 For 
many contemporary American legal scholars like Vermeule, however, 
the history is beside the point; what is important is not the historical 
context in which Schmitt arrived at his understanding of governance, 
but what he understood and explained about the essential nature of 
administration during war and emergency, which is true for every 
democratic government in every era.207 
 This elevation of theory over context is problematic. It is entirely 
possible that rules created in times of emergency and war are intend-
ed to address the current emergency and were never intended to be 
appropriate for future wars or emergencies. Yet path dependency and 
legislative and regulatory ossification leave legal frameworks in place 
long after the problems they were intended to address no longer exist.208 
 Moreover, where Vermeule’s description of black holes in Ameri-
can administrative law fits uneasily with Schmitt’s approach is in the 
concept of emergency. Although the core of Schmitt’s work explored 
states of “exception” (Ausnahmezustand), his later writings made 
clear that he meant for the term to encompass much more than what 
we commonly understand to be emergencies—temporary periods of 
extreme peril, such as war or natural disasters.209 In fact, Schmitt 
ultimately concluded that, to limit the exception to emergencies—or 
to impose any limitations at all on the breadth of the concept—would 
                                                                                                                  
 204. See Telman, supra note 202, at 130-32 (discussing the influence of World War I 
and the collapse of the pre-war order on Schmitt’s philosophy). For biographical infor-
mation about Schmitt, see, for example, JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST 
FOR THE REICH (1983). 
 205. See Telman, supra note 202, at 136 (“Having struggled, along with others, to pro-
vide the fledgling Weimar Republic with a legal theory that could guarantee its stability, 
Schmitt arrived at the conclusion that the Sovereign needed, in certain situations, to be-
come the exception that cannot be bound by law.”). 
 206. Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, TELOS, Fall 1987, at 37, 
37-39; Telman, supra note 202, at 131-32. 
 207. Writing with Eric Posner, Vermeule described his approach as “extract[ing] the 
marrow from Schmitt and then throw[ing] away the bones for the professional exegetes to 
gnaw.” ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38 (2007).  
 208. Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions That Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency Gov-
ernment in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
124, 124-34 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., Princeton University Press 2010) 
(detailing examples of foreign and domestic legislative acts that tend to “constitutionalize 
emergency exceptions to normal government” (emphasis omitted)); cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, 
STATE OF EXCEPTION 2 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (contending that 
states of emergency tend to become permanent). 
 209. See Gross, supra note 44, at 1826-28. 
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endanger the state by constraining the executive’s ability to deter-
mine when a state of exception exists and to respond appropriately.210  
 Therefore, our administrative law is both more and less Schmitti-
an than Vermeule describes. It is more Schmittian because many of 
the black holes that he identifies are regularly used by agencies in 
times of peace and non-emergency. This is especially true of the na-
tional security exception. There was, for example, no war or emer-
gency concerning Canada that required the FCC to issue regulations 
limiting the power of AM radio stations without notice-and-
comment.211 The same could be said of most regulations to which the 
courts have concluded the exception applies.212 At the same time, the 
national security exception is perhaps less Schmittian because, alt-
hough it may be broadly construed, it is arguable whether it truly 
constitutes a “suspension of the entire existing order.”213 The only 
way to make the actual operation of the exception fit with Vermeule’s 
use of the word “emergency” would be to acknowledge that we live in 
a permanent state of emergency.214  
 The problem with Vermeule’s Schmittian approach to our admin-
istrative law, then, is that, like Schmitt’s own theories, it has little to 
offer concerning the limits of the state of exception. A Schmitti-
an/Vermeulian approach to the national security exception would be 
an acknowledgement that it has no practical limits. The exception is 
capable of swallowing the general rule.  
 Yet if we wish to impose some limits on the exception, how can we 
do so? Although there are many ways to approach this question, the 
historical context in which the APA’s national security exception was 
created reveals a great deal about why the exception was believed to 
be necessary at the time and whether it continues to be necessary 
today. The next Part offers the first explanation for the exception 
based on this historical context. 
                                                                                                                  
 210. See William E. Scheuerman, Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal 
Thought: The Case of Carl Schmitt, 17 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 571, 589 (1996) (“If legal inde-
terminacy is a truly ubiquitous facet of legal experience, then dictatorship similarly must 
take something close to an omnipresent, even permanent form.”). 
 211. See WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 212. See supra notes 166-184 and accompanying text. 
 213. SCHMITT, supra note 192, at 12. 
 214. This is in fact exactly what Italian political theorist Giorgio Agamben has argued, 
using Schmitt’s theories and the Guantánamo Bay detention camp as points of departure. 
See AGAMBEN, supra note 208, at 2 (“[T]he voluntary creation of a permanent state of 
emergency . . . has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including 
so-called democratic ones.”). 
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IV.   THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 
 The conventional wisdom assumes that the fundamental exigen-
cies driving national security rulemaking are basically static.215 De-
fenders of national security exceptionalism argue that the nature of 
national security policymaking is fundamentally different from ordi-
nary policymaking, while critics argue that exceptional treatment of 
national security policymaking threatens democratic values.216 The 
debate is an essentialist one. However, it is entirely possible that, as 
the world changes and threats to America’s security change with it, 
the architecture of the administrative state ought to change in re-
sponse. If this is so, it is vitally important to understand the historical 
context in which current administrative law doctrine was developed.  
 This Part departs from the conventional wisdom and advances an 
alternative interpretation of the APA’s national security exception 
that is rooted in the history surrounding its enactment. Despite the 
dearth of specific legislative history explaining the exception with 
respect to the final APA itself, it is possible to reconstruct the excep-
tion’s purpose by reference to the historical context, the debates sur-
rounding the predecessor legislation to the APA, and influential con-
ceptions of organizational theory at the time of the APA’s enactment.217  
 An examination of this context reveals the striking degree to 
which the national security exceptionalism embedded in our current 
administrative law regime was a creature of the unique geopolitical 
and domestic political concerns of the 1930s and 1940s. Pearl Harbor, 
the rise of fascism, and the war-related failures of federal govern-
                                                                                                                  
 215. See supra Part III. For an argument that, although the conventional wisdom as-
sumes that national security considerations are timeless, they are in fact rooted in outdat-
ed views of international relations theory, see Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and 
the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 93 (2009). 
 216. Compare Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 
943-44 (2004) (arguing that foreign affairs (and national security) matters deserve unique 
treatment by courts and in constitutional law), and supra notes 197-201, with Jeremy 
Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 206 (2003) (“We 
have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be 
used by the government against its enemies . . . .”). 
 217. The following is drawn from primary sources and invaluable historians’ and politi-
cal scientists’ accounts of the APA and its era—in particular, those that describe the deep 
connection between New Deal politics and international relations and those addressing 
specifically the debate surrounding administrative law reform. Especially helpful were 
DUDZIAK, supra note 44; KATZNELSON, supra note 40; IDO OREN, OUR ENEMIES AND US: 
AMERICA’S RIVALRIES AND THE MAKING OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (2003); DOUGLAS T. STUART, 
CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED 
AMERICA (2008) (offering a definitive history of the National Security Act); Kovacs, supra 
note 125; McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World 
War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE 
AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 185 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., Praeger 
Publishers 2002); and George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Proce-
dure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). 
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ment agencies were constantly on the minds of those contemplating 
and constructing the modern administrative state. 
 These contemporaneous concerns infused, even distorted, the de-
bate concerning administrative law reform to such a degree that 
there is, ironically, very little discussion of national security rule-
making, as such, in the legislative history of the bill that became the 
APA.218 Nonetheless, through a decades-long, often-vitriolic debate on 
reforming the administrative state that culminated in the APA, a 
story emerges about the origins of national security rulemaking: 
against the backdrop of a world in crisis, with the rise of fascist pow-
ers—and eventually, a world war against those powers—Congress 
decided to carve out greater and greater space for a distinct regime of 
national security rulemaking, even as it created a regime for ordinary 
rulemaking intended to rein in the excesses of the administrative state.  
 The APA emerged as the ultimate compromise after a long strug-
gle during the 1930s and ’40s by New Deal opponents to tame the 
growing administrative state.219 With respect to core administrative 
law issues such as judicial review of agency action, it reflected the 
settlement of “ ‘long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and en-
act[ed] a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have 
come to rest.’ ”220   
 Yet by the time Congress debated the bill that became the APA, 
the question of how to treat national security rulemaking appears to 
have been largely settled. The presence of the national security ex-
ception was little remarked upon,221 and it was often referred to as 
“self-explanatory.”222 The explanations that were offered seem to 
suggest that some in Congress believed it should be narrowly con-
strued. One Congressman, in reference to the exception, said the fol-
lowing: “The exemption of military and naval functions needs no ex-
planation here. The exempted foreign affairs are those diplomatic 
functions of high importance which do not lend themselves to public 
procedures and with which the general public is ordinarily not di-
rectly concerned.”223 The House and Senate Report cautioned against 
overbroad interpretation:  
                                                                                                                  
 218. See Tibbels, supra note 34, at 395 n.27 (noting that the legislative history on the 
exception is limited to a paragraph). 
 219. See generally Shepherd, supra note 217. 
 220. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
523 (1978) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)). 
 221. Hathaway, supra note 34, at 243 n.312. 
 222. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG. (Comm. Print 1945), 
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS, 
1944–46, at 15, 17 (1946); see also Hathaway, supra note 34, at 171-72. 
 223. 92 CONG. REC. 5650 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter).  
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The phrase “foreign affairs functions,” used here and in some other 
provisions of the bill, is not to be loosely interpreted to mean any 
function extending beyond the borders of the United States but on-
ly those “affairs” which so affect relations with other governments 
that, for example, public rule making provisions would clearly pro-
voke definitely undesirable international consequences.224  
 Although some in Congress apparently believed that the national 
security administrative state should be small, the Executive Branch, 
after the APA became law, seized on the provision’s language to imag-
ine a vast regime of national security rulemaking. Indeed, as the first 
scholar to analyze the exception observed, “the language of the . . . ex-
emption is very broad” and the “functions excluded are written in 
terms easily susceptible to wide application.”225 The influential 1947 
Interpretive Guide to the APA issued by the office of the Attorney 
General and future Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark took what one 
commentator has called an “exceptionally sweeping” view of the na-
tional security exception’s scope.226 The Attorney General’s Manual 
is, for courts, a “key document” for interpreting the APA, contains the 
“most authoritative account” of the history of its passage,227 and has 
been “given some deference . . . because of the role played by the De-
partment of Justice in drafting the legislation.”228  
 The reference to “military and naval functions” in the national se-
curity exception, the Manual concluded, was “not limited to activities 
of the War and Navy Departments but covers all military and naval 
functions exercised by any agency.”229 For example, the Manual of-
fered, “the exemption applies to the defense functions of the Coast 
Guard and to the function of the Federal Power Commission under 
section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act.”230 By referring to “foreign 
affairs functions,” according to the Manual, the provision was “appli-
cable to most functions of the State Department and to the foreign 
affairs functions of any other agency.”231  
 The Manual’s broad interpretation of the national security excep-
tion was the culmination of a trend that began with that era’s first 
                                                                                                                  
 224. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 13, 16 (1945); see also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 2-3, 23,  
27 (1946). 
 225. Bonfield, supra note 22, at 238. 
 226. Tibbels, supra note 34, at 396; see generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 26-27 (1947)  
[hereinafter MANUAL]. 
 227. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 362 (1st Cir. 
2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 228. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
546 (1978). 
 229. MANUAL, supra note 226, at 26. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 27. 
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efforts at administrative law reform. From the first proposed legisla-
tion intended to restrain administrative agencies in 1929, to the final 
passage of the APA in 1946, with some exceptions, each subsequent 
draft of legislation recognized a broader national security adminis-
trative state than the one before it. The earliest proposals, which saw 
no action in Congress, did not mention the military or foreign affairs 
at all.232 By 1937, however, the world had changed and domestic poli-
tics along with it. Much of the public had begun to perceive agencies 
in the Roosevelt Administration as overreaching. Amid a recession 
and backlash against Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, and with a new-
ly-quiescent Supreme Court no longer willing to strike down New 
Deal programs, support for administrative reform as a counter-
balance to the New Deal grew.233 The anti-New Deal “conservative 
coalition” of Republicans and mostly-Southern Democrats took effec-
tive control in Congress.234 
 Fears of federal agencies run amuck became intertwined with in-
creasing awareness by Americans of totalitarianism in Europe and 
Asia. Through the 1930s, the United States had closer ties with Fas-
cist Italy than the Communist USSR, Nazi Germany, or Imperial Ja-
pan.235 For many Americans, however, the entanglement of business 
and government in fascist states bore a disturbing similarity to the 
way U.S. government agencies were closely involved with businesses 
in controlling wages and prices and the detailed regulation of indus-
tries.236 The floor debates on APA predecessor legislation during the 
1930s and ’40s reflect these concerns: they are “ ‘riddled with compar-
isons of the administrative state to fascist and communist govern-
                                                                                                                  
 232. These early proposals, which began before FDR took office, sought simply to vest 
review of administrative decisions in the courts, which were considered conservative and 
skeptical of regulation. See Kovacs, supra note 125, at 681-83; Shepherd, supra note 217, at 
1566-67. The first proposal introduced by Senator George Norris in 1929, see S. 5154, 70th 
Cong. (1929), went nowhere because even conservatives thought it unnecessary. See Ko-
vacs, supra note 125, at 682-83.  
 233. See KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 256-75 (describing the court-packing plan and 
recession); Shepherd, supra note 217, at 1586-93 (describing gathering momentum for  
administrative reform). 
 234. See McNollgast, supra note 217, at 204. 
 235. See KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 92-93 (“[C]ore policymakers . . . were drawn to 
Mussolini’s Italy, which self-identified as a country that had saved capitalism.”); id. at 63-
68 (describing the rapturous public reception Fascist Italy’s Air Force Marshall and Musso-
lini heir-apparent Italo Balbo received during a visit to the United States). 
 236. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Of Corporatism, Fascism, and the First New Deal, 39 
AM. J. COMP. L. 747, 748 (1991) (“To supporters and critics alike, [the National Recovery 
Act], a vast scheme for delegating governmental authority to private cartels, seemed akin 
to the ‘corporativism’ of Italian Fascism.”); Hoover Warns New Deal Leads U.S. to Fascism, 
WASH. POST, May 6, 1938, at X2 (summarizing and quoting a speech by FDR’s defeated 
predecessor, Herbert Hoover, broadcast to millions on the radio). For a recent revisionist 
history echoing these criticisms and roundly condemning the New Deal’s economic reforms 
and alleged autocratic tendencies, see AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW 
HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2007).  
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ments’ ” and accusations that administrative agencies were being 
used to advance FDR’s totalitarian ambitions.237 
 In 1937, the influential (and decidedly anti-New Deal) ABA Spe-
cial Committee on Administrative Law, led by the “dyspeptic” former 
Harvard Law Dean, Roscoe Pound,238 drafted legislation that would 
have imposed tighter control on agencies than earlier proposals. It 
required notice and public hearings prior to regulation, formal ad-
ministrative hearings, and judicial review.239 At the same time, 
however, perhaps recognizing the increasing instability in geopoli-
tics, the Committee proposed to exempt from the bill “foreign af-
fairs” and “the conduct of military or naval operations in time of 
war or civil insurrection.”240  
 Two years later, after Hitler had invaded Poland and World War 
II had begun,241 a bill similar to the APA’s proposal was introduced in 
Congress as the Walter-Logan Bill.242 The national security exception 
now was slightly broader: it excluded altogether “any matter concern-
ing or relating to the conduct of foreign affairs” and “the conduct of 
military or naval operations in time of war or civil insurrection.”243 
Despite the presence of these exceptions, they were strongly criti-
cized as too narrow. As the nation sought to absorb the news of the 
devastating strength of Hitler’s military and the relative weakness of 
America’s,244 the War Department savaged the Walter-Logan bill, ar-
guing that it would be “gravely subversive of military discipline in all 
components of the Army, destructive of efficiency in the performance 
                                                                                                                  
 237. See Kovacs, supra note 125, at 685 (quoting Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and 
Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 86 (2000)). 
 238. Schiller, supra note 217, at 197 (describing Pound as “dyspeptic”). 
 239. Shepherd, supra note 217, at 1582-83; Report of the Special Committee on Admin-
istrative Law, 62 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 846-50 (1937) [hereinafter Special Committee].  
 240. Special Committee, supra note 239, at 789. For various reasons—having mostly to 
do with pre-existing judicial review provisions—the Committee also exempted the Federal 
Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
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(1939); Schiller, supra note 217, at 197. 
 243. S. 915, 76th Cong. § 6(b) (1939). 
 244. See KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 306-08; GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN 
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the USSR, and that Western democracies “had become militarily outclassed”). 
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of the functions of the War Department, both military and non-
military, obstructive to progress in preparedness for national de-
fense, and generally disastrous from the viewpoint of the public in-
terest.”245 The bill would, according to the Department, enable mili-
tary personnel to challenge orders “on any occasion except in time of 
war or insurrection.”246 The Department suggested that “all matters 
concerning or relating to the operations of the War Department and 
the Army” be exempted.247  
 In response to these objections, one of the bill’s co-sponsors, Sena-
tor M.M. Logan, amended the bill in a draft that defined “agency” for 
the first time, and he broadened the military exception so that it ap-
plied “to the conduct of military or naval operations” at all times.248 
However, the new draft did not include an exception for foreign af-
fairs. Although the House Judiciary Committee reported a similar 
bill favorably, an influential critique emerged from Congressman Cel-
lar, a co-sponsor of the earlier, even more restrictive ABA bill. Con-
gressman Cellar, who had a change of heart, now argued that “it 
would be manifestly inappropriate to require the War Department to 
conduct hearings on Army regulations.”249 As the House debated the 
bill just days after Hitler invaded Denmark, other congressmen also 
complained that the military exception was too narrow.250 A last-
minute amendment by Congressman Walter purported to further ex-
pand the exception, re-defining “military ‘operations’ to include ‘strictly 
military and naval activities of the War and Navy Departments.’ ”251  
 The Senate grappled with similar concerns. Two months later, in 
summer 1940, Hitler’s armies marched into Paris and the Luftwaffe 
                                                                                                                  
 245. Letter from Harry H. Woodring, Sec’y of War, U.S. War Dep’t, to Rep. Hatton W. 
Sumners, Chairman, Judiciary Comm., U.S. House of Representatives (May 6, 1939), re-
printed in Bills to Provide for the More Expeditious Settlement of Disputes with the United 
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Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 102 (1939). 
 246. Id. at 103.  
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 248. S. REP. NO. 76-442, at 1, 5 (1939). 
 249. H.R. REP. NO. 76-1149, pt. 2, at 6 (1940) (Minority Rep.); see also id. at 5 (contend-
ing that the exception should encompass “other activities” of the Departments of War and 
the Navy “which highly affect public interest and the national defense, such as river and 
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 250. Id. at 688; see 86 CONG. REC. 4653 (1940) (statement of Rep. McGranery) (contend-
ing that the exemption would enable military personnel to challenge promotion decisions in 
the courts of appeals and substitute the court’s judgment for that of armed services). But 
see id. at 4649 (statement of Rep. Gwynne) (arguing, in defense of the existing language, 
that “the actual conduct of the armies and the navies is an executive function and Congress 
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 251. Kovacs, supra note 125, at 688 (quoting 86 CONG. REC. 4725 (1940) (statement of 
Rep. Walter)). Congressmen disagreed about whether this actually narrowed or broadened 
the national security exception, but the language was added and the bill passed. See id.  
at 689. 
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began the London Blitz while “[a] remarkable national consensus de-
veloped among political leaders and the mass populace to build 
American strength,”252 and Congress was debating what would be-
come the first peacetime conscription bill in U.S. history.253 The Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, working from the same language as the 
House, expanded the exception further, omitting the word “conduct” 
and adding the phrase “any other agency or authority hereafter cre-
ated to expedite military and naval defense.”254  Congressman 
Sumners, a proponent of the bill, concluded that this language “co-
vers everything that may be done by any agency concerning or relat-
ing to the Military and Naval Establishments.”255 Congressman 
Cochran thought the language was still not broad enough and would 
not cover civilian agencies “performing functions which are indispen-
sable to the workings of our defense program.”256 In any event, the 
full Senate adopted this language, and the House concurred in  
December 1940.257  
 Yet despite the support of large majorities from both parties in 
Congress, the Walter-Logan bill would not become law. President 
Roosevelt vetoed it on December 18, 1940, unhappy with the con-
straints it imposed on administrative agencies, but also concerned 
about its effect on preparations for war.258 In his veto statement, Roo-
sevelt articulated the need for a broader national security adminis-
trative state. He noted that Walter-Logan would impose new regula-
tory burdens on agencies, such as the Maritime Commission and the 
Departments of Commerce and Treasury, “whose activities have an 
important collateral effect on the defense program,” and which had 
“pointed out serious delays and uncertainties which would be caused 
by the present bill.”259 An attempted veto override in the House failed 
that same day.260 
 Although his veto was sustained, Roosevelt had recognized the 
momentum behind the reformers and already ordered the creation of 
                                                                                                                  
 252. KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 307. 
 253. See 86 CONG. REC. 11,489 (1940); KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 312-13 (describ-
ing the conscription bill as “revolutionary”).  
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an Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 
which submitted a report on January 22, 1941.261 The report con-
tained two proposals for legislation—one from the liberal majority 
and one from the conservative minority.262 Both bills gave more flexi-
bility to agencies than had the ill-fated Walter-Logan bill, but their 
approaches varied on both ordinary rulemaking and national security 
rulemaking. The liberal bill “imposed little restraint on agencies,” 
while the conservative bill “would have controlled agencies substan-
tially.”263 The liberal bill, however, did not exempt national security 
rulemaking at all, while the conservative bill carved out national se-
curity exceptions that began to closely resemble those that would be 
in the APA. The conservative bill authorized the President to tempo-
rarily suspend any of the act’s provisions under certain circumstanc-
es.264 And with respect to notice-and-comment rulemaking, it provid-
ed that “[w]henever expressly found by an agency to be contrary to 
the public interest, the provisions of this title, in whole or part, shall 
not apply to . . . the conduct of military, naval, or national-defense 
functions, or the selection or procurement of men or materials for the 
armed forces of the United States . . . .”265 
 Both bills were introduced in Congress, which debated them dur-
ing the summer of 1941, as Nazi Germany began its brutal invasion 
of the Soviet Union, and Japan had already “conquered the Philip-
pines, Burma, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East 
Indies.”266 The War Department objected that the national security 
exceptions in both bills were still inadequate, arguing that the mili-
tary “could not properly function” if it had to meet the procedural re-
quirements and demanding a full exception for all activities of the 
War Department and all military branches.267 The Attorney General’s 
Committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary (and future Secretary) of 
State Dean Acheson—who would play a key role in restructuring the 
national security state after the war268—did not seem to share these 
concerns, describing as “very clear” the majority bill's exceptions for 
                                                                                                                  
 261. S. DOC. NO. 77-8 (1941); Shepherd, supra note 217, at 1632. 
 262. Shepherd, supra note 217, at 1632. 
 263. Id. at 1633-34. 
 264. S. 674, 77th Cong. § 111 (1941). 
 265. Id. § 201. 
 266. See KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 41. 
 267. Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Sub-
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“the military service, the armed forces, or the selection and discharge of 
employees.”269 But the Committee, in another sense, chose to go further.  
 In rejecting agency-specific exceptions to rulemaking require-
ments, the Committee instead settled on a “functional” approach, un-
der which any agency would be exempt from rulemaking (and adjudi-
cation) requirements to the extent that it performed certain substan-
tive functions.270 This functional approach prevailed and was includ-
ed in the APA. This approach would limit the scope of the exception 
in some respects: no agency could firmly declare itself entirely free of 
notice-and-comment requirements.271 On the other hand, the func-
tional approach vastly expanded the number of agencies that could 
engage in national security rulemaking. In practice, this meant that 
agencies across the government could, and did, rely on the exception, 
to varying degrees, to eschew notice-and-comment procedures.272 And, 
as it turned out, agencies would enjoy a great deal of discretion to use 
the exception when they saw fit.273  
 Although administrative law reform was largely put on the back 
burner while the war was waged, by 1946, with the war over and 
New Dealers on the defensive in Congress, the moment for compre-
hensive administrative law reform had finally arrived.274 The APA 
would be enacted into law by year’s end.275 
 Nonetheless, the lessons learned from the war about the appropri-
ate way to control the exploding administrative state were hardly 
straightforward. During the war, administrative agencies had grown 
even more powerful and more numerous, but significantly less popu-
lar. Americans were chafing under the price controls, comprehensive 
rationing, and other rigid regulations required during wartime.276 
The war revealed the ugly side of bureaucracies, which proved to be 
often “inefficient, incompetent, bullying, and perhaps even captured 
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by the interests they were supposed to regulate.”277 One scholar con-
cluded that the experience “weakened Americans’ faith in expertise.”278 
 Americans’ confidence in the administrative state had been fur-
ther weakened by the struggle against fascism. Before the war, many 
American political scientists had studied the governance of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy with great interest and even admira-
tion.279 Many more expressed not illegitimate fears that the United 
States would be left behind if it did not, in some sense, emulate these 
rising foreign powers.280  
 During the war, such scholars either abandoned their earlier 
views or fell into disrepute.281 There was a widespread belief among 
the public that “administrative power could pave the road to totali-
tarianism” and “ ‘the claim that imposing the rule of law on agency 
behavior could protect Americans from an administrative state run 
amok . . . was increasingly heard across the political spectrum.’ ”282 
 Despite the disgust with which the fascist governments were re-
garded after the war, policymakers in the military and foreign affairs 
establishments were well aware that the United States had, in one 
sense, needed to beat the enemy at its own game in order to win the 
war. Only through aggressive centralization, militarization, and, of-
ten, lack of transparency—hallmarks of fascist governance—had the 
United States managed to mobilize its resources so quickly and com-
prehensively during the early 1940s to meet the challenge of defeat-
ing Hitler, Mussolini, and Imperial Japan.283 Pendleton Herring, a 
prominent theorist of governmental organization highly influential in 
the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, had argued that “totali-
tarian states can be opposed only through an equally effective mobili-
zation of resources.”284 Twenty-six new agencies with broad powers 
had been created during the war.285 Moreover, the United States 
                                                                                                                  
 277. Schiller, supra note 217, at 195; see also id. at 201 (“Too often American wartime 
agencies had the appearance of incompetent bullies, captured by special interests, acting 
with an autocratic disregard of due process.”). 
 278. Schiller, supra note 237, at 92. 
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at 47-49.  
 280. See OREN, supra note 217, at 47-49. 
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 283. See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1461-62 (2012). 
 284. PENDLETON HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR 14 (1941). For a definitive account of 
Herring’s career and influence, see STUART, supra note 217, at 9, 27-32. 
 285. Schiller, supra note 217, at 190. 
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could not have accomplished this task without allying itself with an-
other totalitarian regime, the Soviet Union.286  
 More specifically, the disaster at Pearl Harbor had left an indeli-
ble mark on the thinking of policymakers at the top of the Roosevelt 
and Truman Administrations.287 They, and ultimately the American 
people as well, believed that America had been left vulnerable to 
Japanese aggression by its inability to coordinate defense and mili-
tary functions effectively.288 In addition, those in government respon-
sible for national security had permitted isolationism among the pub-
lic to influence critical decisions about foreign policy and national 
defense in ways that weakened America’s position in the world.289 
The same values that were praised by proponents of administrative 
law reform that undergird the APA—transparency, legitimacy, delib-
eration, and accessibility, among others—were regarded as danger-
ous in the national security context.290  
  The threat of fascism and communism had therefore affected the 
APA debate in complex, conflicting ways. Influential members of the 
Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, such as Herring, Dean 
Acheson (who had chaired Roosevelt’s Committee that proposed the 
bill that became the APA), and George Marshall, adhered to a “Pearl 
Harbor” view of government policymaking that treated national secu-
rity matters as uniquely requiring a closed, militarized, and central-
ized process—just the opposite of the principles of transparency, pub-
lic participation, and judicial oversight animating the APA.291  
 The year after Congress enacted the APA, it enacted the APA’s 
mirror image—the National Security Act (NSA) of 1947.292 In con-
trast to the APA, the NSA, the crafting of which was very heavily in-
fluenced by Herring, was entirely animated by the Pearl Harbor 
view.293 Congress debated it in the shadow of the harsh, bi-partisan 
report on the Pearl Harbor attacks issued in mid-1946.294 The NSA’s 
purpose was to centralize government decisionmaking in the national 
security realm and, for the most part, insulate it from public scruti-
                                                                                                                  
 286. See KATZNELSON, supra note 40, at 32, 94-95 (describing the alliance and Ameri-
cans’ ambivalence about the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s). 
 287. See STUART, supra note 203, at 42.  
 288. Id. at 43, 70-71. 
 289. See id. at 39-40. 
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 291. See STUART, supra note 217, at 41-42, 70-71. 
 292. National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495.  
 293. See STUART, supra note 217, at 8-9. 
 294. David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State 138-39 (2000); see also J. Comm. on 
the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, S. 
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ny. Although the Act’s supporters were not able to accomplish their 
goal of unifying the military services, the NSA created what became 
known as the Department of Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the National Security Council, and the CIA.295 
 The co-existence of these two radically different perspectives on 
the lessons for the administrative state to be learned from World War 
II—the Reform view animating the APA and the Pearl Harbor view 
animating the NSA—are also reflected in the structure of the APA. 
The national security exception enshrines the Pearl Harbor view 
within the constitution of the modern administrative state. 
 The Pearl Harbor view’s influence on legislation and agency be-
havior was powerful, but not particularly prominent in the debates 
on administrative reform.296 It was only years later that the govern-
ment agencies benefitting most from the national security exception 
would be required to defend it to Congress.297 
 In 1964, congressional committees first began to scrutinize the 
national security exception and its justifications.298 By then, the Cold 
War had replaced World War II as the main inspiration for national 
security exceptionalism.299 And yet the arguments in favor of national 
security administration remained the same. The difference is that, by 
this point, they had been essentially abstracted from the post-World 
War II historical context in which they had emerged and the debates 
over fascism that had inspired them. 
 The justifications for the national security exception articulated 
by agencies in 1964 are familiar ones. They appear frequently in cas-
es and scholarly defenses of national security exceptionalism in gen-
eral.300 The first rationale agencies submitted to Congress to justify 
the exception is that national security often requires secrecy, which 
is defeated by public participation.301 Second, the agencies argued, 
the fluid nature of international relations requires agencies to react 
quickly.302 Suppose, for example, that the DoD must respond to a 
coup in a foreign country by immediately revising its rules regarding 
                                                                                                                  
 295. See STUART, supra note 217, at 110-50. 
 296. See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text. 
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 302. See id. at 279-80. 
2014]  NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 931  
 
military support for that country’s government.303 Notice-and-
comment would make this impossible. Finally, because nations are 
unitary actors on the world stage, the United States must “speak 
with one voice” in foreign relations; agencies must act in a coordinat-
ed fashion and cannot be changing positions in response to public 
comment without risking embarrassment and undermining U.S. for-
eign policy.304 For example, as a DOJ spokesman testified to Con-
gress, “[a] requirement of public participation in . . . promulgation of 
rules to govern our relationships with other nations . . . would en-
courage public demonstrations by extremist factions which might 
embarrass foreign officials and seriously prejudice our conduct of  
foreign affairs.”305 
 These justifications are variations on the familiar tropes that still 
dominate national security and foreign relations law.306 They are 
rarely challenged outside academia, and their origins and theoretical 
justifications are rarely discussed. But those justifications are sur-
prisingly brittle.307 As reasons for exempting national security rule-
making entirely from notice-and-comment, moreover, they fall short. 
As Professor Arthur Bonfield observed, in some rare situations, truly 
necessary secrecy would make notice-and-comment all but impossi-
ble.308 But this hardly supports removing notice-and-comment entire-
ly from all national security rulemaking. Second, these hoary justifi-
cations rely on an illusion that the boundary between national secu-
rity and ordinary rulemaking can be clearly delineated.309 Finally, 
these justifications draw on overbroad principles that seek to shut 
down, rather than encourage, policy debates. They are too often used 
to avoid accountability and public participation in governance—even 
in aspects of governance, such as rulemaking, in which such accounta-
bility and public participation are thought to be especially important.  
                                                                                                                  
 303. Id. at 280. 
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 The next Part discusses why these tropes do not accurately reflect 
the complexity of rulemaking in today’s world and what should be 
done to reform national security rulemaking. 
V.   REFORMING NATIONAL SECURITY RULEMAKING 
 As the history makes clear, the modern American administrative 
state was formed in the shadows of war and the existential threat 
posed by the rise of totalitarian states. These regimes, by ignoring 
transparency and public participation, could whip their own bureau-
cracies into line, leaving democracies at a disadvantage. Or so many 
believed. In the face of this threat, the APA’s authors carved out 
modes of national security rulemaking distinct from domestic ones.   
 This response was understandable, but it is not at all clear that it 
was correct. One could argue that the United States and its allies 
prevailed over their enemies because of, and not despite, their adher-
ence to democratic values.310  
 And it is even less clear that these distinct modes of national secu-
rity rulemaking are serving the United States well in the twenty-first 
century. Few observers would argue that U.S. government agencies 
are functioning as efficiently or effectively as they should be in the 
national security realm. Obsession with secrecy, overclassification,311 
unnecessary redundancy, lack of coordination, inter- and intra-
agency communication failures, and lack of accountability to the pub-
lic—these are just a few of the criticisms regularly leveled at agencies 
by observers inside and outside government.312 Legislative efforts to 
reform the intelligence community after September 11—in part by 
creating the Department of Homeland Security and the position of 
Director of National Intelligence, who would, in theory, coordinate 
intelligence-gathering—was followed by massive growth in the num-
ber and type of agencies handling secret and top-secret intelligence 
and simply made these problems worse.313  
 Moreover, several factors have led to increasing entanglement of 
the government’s national security policies with the lives of ordinary 
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Americans. Globalization continues to blur, and even erase, the dis-
tinction for Americans between what is foreign and what is domes-
tic.314 The terrorist threat emerges primarily from small groups and 
individuals, rather than nation-states; in response, government more 
closely monitors the lives of individuals to learn about and stop these 
threats.315 Agencies’ national security rulemaking therefore falls 
more often into the category of “substantive” or “legislative” than ev-
er before: because it directly affects the public, it was meant to be 
conducted through notice-and-comment procedures so that the public 
can be involved. 
 For the founders of modern American administrative law, this 
state of affairs would be seen as the worst of both worlds. National 
security rulemaking today lacks both the democracy and accountabil-
ity-enhancing features of ordinary rulemaking and the centralization 
and efficiency that were supposed to characterize rulemaking in the 
areas of military and foreign affairs.316 It is hard to justify maintain-
ing broad substantive exceptions from notice-and-comment require-
ments for national security rulemaking when agencies conducting such 
rulemaking are largely inefficient, uncoordinated, and ineffective.317  
 In light of these changes, the traditional distinction between na-
tional security and ordinary rulemaking must be re-examined. U.S. 
foreign and national security policy, as well as ordinary policy, can in 
many, if not most, instances best be furthered by greater transparen-
cy, public participation, and deliberation—values that the APA’s no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking procedures advance.   
 The APA’s national security exception and the model of agency 
behavior that it signifies are not serving the administrative state 
well. The exception cannot be justified in its current form, and it 
should be modified to better reflect the requirements of regulation 
today. However, the best answer may not be simply making require-
ments for national security rulemaking identical to those for ordinary 
rulemaking. The optimal reforms will encourage more openness in 
rulemaking while recognizing the reality that agencies conducting 
national security rulemaking have the ability, through classification 
authority, to hide their activities from view. Classification reform is 
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also desperately needed, but in the past this has proven very difficult 
to implement successfully.318 
 In fact, legislative reform in general would be a challenge. Amend-
ing the APA, given its quasi-constitutional status, is an immensely 
difficult legislative task.319 And the Vermont Yankee doctrine general-
ly prohibits courts from imposing additional rulemaking procedures 
beyond those required by the APA.320  
 Instead, reform is more likely to take place within the executive 
branch. In the past, this has been the primary means by which limi-
tations have been placed on the national security administrative 
state.321 In response to loss of public confidence and increased scruti-
ny after national security scandals, administrations have sought to 
pre-empt legislative solutions through the use of executive orders and 
regulations.322 To enact comprehensive national security rulemaking 
reform, the President could issue an executive order that, like E.O. 
12,866, requires additional procedural requirements for rulemaking 
by non-independent federal agencies. Such an executive order would 
legally bind those agencies. And it could be enforceable in court—
especially if the order itself so provided.323 
 One risk, of course, is that executive branch reforms are more eas-
ily undone than legislation. National security agencies, in particular, 
have a tendency to revert, over time, to more insular and opaque 
modes of operation as they seek to expand their power within the bu-
reaucracy.324 Nonetheless, many past executive branch reforms have 
had “stickiness”: they have persisted and become part of agency cul-
ture.325 In any event, although they may be second-best solutions, 
they are better than the status quo.  
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A.   Eliminating the National Security Rulemaking Exception 
 To begin with, it is worth exploring whether the national security 
exception should be eliminated altogether. This change’s impact on 
rulemaking would be vast. For the large number of agencies that, 
unlike DoD, currently lack internal rules requiring notice-and-
comment, their non-secret rulemaking would be opened up to public 
input for the first time. In addition, many other departments or 
agencies, particularly within the Treasury and Commerce Depart-
ments, that do, or might be disposed to, rely on the national security 
exception would be required to undertake notice-and-comment for 
many types of rules that had been previously exempt.  
 For those critics of notice-and-comment rulemaking, of course, this 
would be moving in precisely the wrong direction, as the burden im-
posed on these agencies would likely be a substantial one. A complex 
rule can elicit thousands of comments or more, requiring hundreds of 
pages to address in the final rule’s statement of basis and purpose.326 
Indeed, these critics argue that the procedure is not worth its cost in 
any policy area.327 In particular, they argue, notice-and-comment may 
have an anti-regulatory bias, imposing unacceptably high burdens on 
government agencies when swift and decisive regulatory action is 
necessary to address urgent problems.328  
 Moreover, even if one believes that notice-and-comment’s benefits 
exceed its costs in ordinary rulemaking, national security matters 
remain unique in ways that may make notice-and-comment still in-
appropriate—even though many of the particular concerns that drove 
the creation of the national security administrative state no longer 
exist. For one thing, the stakes are quite often higher where national 
security is concerned, which could make an anti-regulatory bias par-
ticularly problematic.329 For example, if the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration fails to promulgate a rule requiring more auto 
safety testing, this may, over time, cost lives. But if government 
agencies fail to properly regulate the disposal of nuclear material 
that falls into terrorists’ hands, the consequences could present an 
existential threat to the United States.330  
 In addition, even in a globalized world, where special interest 
groups often fiercely lobby national security policymakers, secrecy—
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or at least some degree of opacity—still has an important place in 
national security policymaking. Suppose, as one critic has asked us to 
imagine, that the notice-and-comment requirements were imposed on 
decisions about military support for Taiwan and its effect on rela-
tions with China or the rules governing targeting of Al Qaeda 
safehouses.331 This would expose to public (indeed, global) scrutiny 
the inner workings of the government’s military and diplomatic ma-
chinery, making it much more difficult for the United States to effec-
tively eliminate dangerous enemies or to conduct the delicate give-
and-take at the heart of diplomacy.  
 However, in measuring notice-and-comment’s value for national 
security rulemaking, it is important to take account of all the ways in 
which the APA and other laws insulate these types of agency deci-
sionmaking from public scrutiny. First, even without the national 
security exception, administrative law would treat the two examples 
above quite differently. Although rulemaking regarding military aid 
to foreign countries would arguably require notice-and-comment, mil-
itary-targeting rulemaking—along with many other rules regarding 
the conduct of military operations abroad—would almost certainly 
fall within the exclusion from the APA of “military authority exer-
cised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”332  
 Second, as Professor Evan Criddle has persuasively argued, at 
least some of these concerns can be addressed through the APA’s 
“good cause” exception, which authorizes rulemaking without notice-
and-comment when it would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or con-
trary to the public interest.”333 In particular, agencies could rely on 
previous cases in which courts have approved agencies’ invocation of 
the exception as “contrary to the public interest” when undertaking 
notice-and-comment would thwart the rule’s purpose.334 Similarly, 
when national security rules issued during a crisis situation must 
take effect immediately, notice-and-comment rulemaking could be 
considered by a court to be “impracticable.”335 
 At the same time, requiring agencies to rely on the “good cause” 
exception instead of the national security exception would discipline 
agency decisionmaking by requiring the agency to articulate a legal 
basis for departing from the ordinary APA process. The APA provi-
sion establishing the “good cause” exception requires that the agency 
explicitly invoke the exception when issuing the rule and explain why 
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the exception applies.336 Courts have generally voided rules when the 
agency failed to follow this requirement.337 
 However, one risk in relying on the “good cause” exception in place 
of the national security exception is that it could inspire agencies to 
expand the breadth of rulemaking exempt for good cause, turning the 
exception into something like the all-purpose escape hatch from no-
tice-and-comment that some critics (mistakenly) fear it already is.338 
As the GAO report reveals, the most common reason agencies rely on 
the “good cause” exception is that Congress has either mandated the 
text of the rule or has imposed restrictions making notice-and-
comment impossible.339 It is much less common for an agency to cite 
an “emergency” as the reason for invoking the exception.340 But if the 
national security exception were no longer available, it is easy to see 
how agencies would be tempted to broaden significantly the defini-
tion of “emergency” and expand the category of rules for which notice 
would be “contrary to the public interest.”  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, whether or not agencies 
are relying on the “good cause” exception, eliminating the national 
security exception would leave in place agencies’ power to classify 
information, significantly reducing the plausibility of notice-and-
comment for many rules.341 Imagine a notice of proposed rulemaking 
in which the most important and specific reasons for the proposed 
rule are redacted. Of course, the simple knowledge that an agency is 
conducting rulemaking in a particular area may be useful to the pub-
lic. This enables concerned citizens or interest groups to alert Con-
gress, which may have the ability to further scrutinize or influence 
the agency’s process.342 Outside parties could use the notice as a 
means for crafting more effectively targeted FOIA requests, possibly 
leading to the release of more specific information or, at the very 
least, requiring the agency to articulate in court its reasons for classi-
fying the redacted information. It is also possible, however, that in 
some circumstances an agency could simply determine that the fact 
that rulemaking is taking place should be classified as well.  
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 The authority to classify information is a powerful one. Agencies, 
like most organizations, respond to new challenges using familiar 
tools. There is a risk that, if agencies are forced to open up their de-
liberations via notice-and-comment, they may be inclined to push 
back by ramping up classification to keep those deliberations effec-
tively closed.343 Therefore, a potential difficulty with eliminating the 
national security rulemaking exception is that it could, perversely, 
result in a process even less accessible to the public.  
B.   Encouraging Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking as a Best Practice  
 If eliminating the national security exception would impose unac-
ceptable costs by burdening agencies, encouraging over-classification, 
and failing to take account of the uniqueness of national security 
rulemaking, an alternative approach that avoids these problems 
would be to encourage agencies to use notice-and-comment for na-
tional security rulemaking whenever possible. Under this approach, 
an executive order would mandate notice-and-comment as the default 
mode for national security rulemaking but allow each agency to 
choose to opt out for particular types of rules.344 This approach would 
require agencies to assess the costs and benefits of notice-and-
comment for each category of national security rule and make a de-
termination about whether notice-and-comment will be used for that 
category. It would give agencies sufficient flexibility to permit them 
to take account of the uniqueness of national security policies but 
would bring more regularity and deliberation to the process of de-
parting from notice-and-comment.  
 The value of this approach depends in part on the accuracy of the 
ex ante determinations agencies could be expected to make about 
each type of rule’s suitability for notice-and-comment. For some types 
of rules, the decision could be a relatively easy one. Some agencies 
that regularly make rules in the national security realm already en-
gage in notice-and-comment for certain types of rules. The State De-
partment, for example, uses notice-and-comment in developing most 
                                                                                                                  
 343. Cf. Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom of Information Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the 
Gap Between Legislative Intent and Economic Reality, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 325, 342 (1994) 
(describing agencies’ increasing use of special exceptions to avoid disclosure following a 
sharp increase in FOIA requests). 
 344. Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation 
in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 480-81 (2010) (advocating for a complete re-
peal of the national security exception). 
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)345 and rules imple-
menting the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.346  
 However, in other contexts, agencies will often face difficulty pre-
dicting whether in any particular instance notice-and-comment 
would harm national security interests. For example, one can imag-
ine few harmful national security consequences flowing from using 
notice-and-comment to promulgate rules implementing a trade 
agreement with Great Britain or another liberal democratic ally. On 
the other hand, given the political volatility of U.S. relationships in 
the Middle East, using notice-and-comment for rules implementing a 
similar agreement with a nation in that region could have more neg-
ative national security consequences.  
 Lacking certainty about how notice-and-comment would affect the 
process of national security policymaking for a particular rule, agen-
cies may be inclined to be cautious and avoid it—despite a mandate 
that they adopt it whenever possible. On the other hand, so long as 
the agency is allowed to change its mind and eschew notice-and-
comment should it prove unworkable, agencies could be successfully 
nudged to experiment with notice-and-comment in areas where it has 
not been used.  
 A second factor of equal importance is agency culture. Regardless 
of its value, will agencies voluntarily cede some degree of control over 
the rulemaking process to regulated parties? In general, agencies 
tend to function like fiefdoms—without external pressure to do oth-
erwise, they hoard power, avoid oversight, and provide only ex post 
rationales for their decisionmaking.347 Agencies making rules in the 
national security area are especially likely to operate this way be-
cause their mandate to protect national security provides justifica-
tion for rejecting the ordinary administrative law values of transpar-
ency and accessibility.348  
                                                                                                                  
 345. See, e.g., Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Initial 
Implementation of Export Control Reform, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,740, 22,740-01 (Apr. 16, 2013) 
(to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pts. 120, 121, 123). 
 346. See Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry Adoption Act of 
2000; Accreditation of Agencies; Approval of Persons, 71 Fed. Reg. 8064 (Feb. 15, 2006) (to 
be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 96); see also Anjanette Hamilton, Comment, Privatizing Inter-
national Humanitarian Treaty Implementation: A Critical Analysis of State Department 
Regulations Implementing the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Coopera-
tion in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1053, 1073 (2006).  
 347. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 
700 (2000) (describing the politicized federal agencies as “unruly bureaucratic fiefdoms”); 
Dalal, supra note 132, at 102. 
 348. See Dalal, supra note 132, at 99-100 (describing agencies given the “national security 
mandate” as having stronger incentives to gather more power to carry out that mandate). 
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 On the other hand, there is evidence that agencies often do volun-
tarily seek to learn about best practices and adopt them.349 In many 
instances, a “nudge”350 may be all that is required to persuade an 
agency to use notice-and-comment more often. In addition, even pow-
er-hungry agencies can benefit from increased use of notice-and-
comment. The act of opening up the rulemaking process to the pub-
lic—particularly in response to criticism—has a strong legitimizing 
effect on the rules that are produced and the agency itself. This is 
why, for example, the Department of Homeland Security has chosen 
to use notice-and-comment in developing new rules for Advanced Im-
aging Technology at airports, despite the strong probability that it 
could successfully invoke either the good cause or national security 
exceptions to avoid notice-and-comment.351 Agencies may rationally 
conclude that the legitimacy gained is worth the cost of increased 
public awareness. 
 Agencies also may rationally conclude that voluntarily adopting 
notice-and-comment is actually a way to avoid further congressional 
scrutiny and possible legislative reforms. In fact, executive branch 
reform is a strategy the President and DoD have used in the past to 
head off more restrictive legislation during periods of intense public 
criticism. The post-Watergate revelations of domestic spying by the 
CIA and other national security-related abuses, documented in the 
Church Committee Hearings and Reports, led to the passage of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.352 But the President preempted 
other types of legislative restrictions—for example, by imposing a 
ban on assassinations by executive order, which arguably contained 
sufficient ambiguity to allow the President to order an assassination 
in some circumstances.353 And, similarly, as discussed above, during 
the same reform-infused era, the Pentagon shrewdly deflected the 
                                                                                                                  
 349. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297-98 (2006) (identifying 
a trend toward “best practices,” a form of regulation “in which regulated entities experi-
ment with best practices as a way of vindicating the broad principles of various regulatory 
programs, while the regulators keep track of their progress and help to celebrate and pub-
licize particularly successful local initiatives”). 
 350. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 7-8 (2008) (proposing that regulators take ac-
count of cognitive biases to craft more effective incentives for regulated parties, including 
default rules that individuals are free to opt out of).  
 351. The agency had not relied on these exceptions earlier. See supra notes 157-160 
and accompanying text. 
 352. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the 
Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 
334-36 (2005). 
 353. William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: 
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 717-20 (2003) (contending that the 
assassination ban contained in President Ford’s 1976 Executive Order 11,905 extended 
only to assassinations, for their political views, of officials of foreign nations with which the 
United States was not at war, and that the president may waive the ban). 
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Administrative Conference’s call for elimination of the national securi-
ty exemption by adopting notice-and-comment for rules “having a sub-
stantial effect upon the public” yet reserving authority to opt out.354 
 The skill with which agencies have used selective internal reforms 
to stave off legislative reform suggests that simply encouraging agen-
cies to use notice-and-comment cannot, by itself, fully transform the 
way national security rulemaking is conducted. Indeed, it may be 
that the types of rulemaking in this area most crippled by insularity 
and lack of deliberation are those that agencies would be least likely 
to want to expose to public scrutiny. A nudge will not always  
be enough. 
C.   Establishing a Chenery-Type Rule for Invoking the National  
Security Exception 
 Notice-and-comment would not be effective without the courts’ en-
forcing the APA requirement and, under Chenery I, requiring agencies 
to sink or swim with the rationales they articulate during the rule-
making process. If agencies are required or strongly encouraged to use 
notice-and-comment for national security rulemaking, the courts will 
necessarily play a larger role in overseeing national security policy. 
For the many critics who believe the courts are far too deferential in 
national security matters, this would be a welcome development.  
 However, to the extent that the national security exception re-
mains a viable option for agencies, the way in which courts treat an 
agency’s invocation of the exception must also be reformed. Current-
ly, courts allow agencies to get away with remaining silent during the 
rulemaking process, issuing a rule without notice-and-comment and, 
when a regulated party challenges the rule on the ground that it was 
promulgated without notice-and-comment, invoking the national se-
curity exemption as a get-out-of-jail-free card.355  
 This permissiveness by courts encourages agencies conducting na-
tional security rulemaking to neglect notice-and-comment. And relat-
edly, when an agency is aware that it need not invoke the exception 
during rulemaking, it will have little incentive to articulate reasons 
why the exception should apply. The bottom line is that, absent unu-
sual public or congressional attention, agencies face little pressure to 
seriously deliberate about the boundaries of the national security ex-
ception and have strong incentives to rely on it whenever it could 
possibly be applicable. The likely result is a largely unmentioned but 
broad exception that becomes broader and broader until the very rare 
case where a court determines that it does not apply.  
                                                                                                                  
 354. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text. 
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 To avoid this ever-expanding national security exception and en-
sure that national security rulemaking is undertaken effectively, 
courts must play the role Chenery recognized for them—to test the 
legality of the rationales the agency actually used to produce a rule 
while it was being produced. The notice-and-comment process is fun-
damental to the proper functioning of the administrative state. A de-
cision by an agency to eschew notice-and-comment should have a le-
gally authorized basis that the agency can articulate during the 
rulemaking process.   
 To encourage the serious deliberation that is a quality of all effec-
tive rulemaking, agencies should be required to specifically invoke 
the national security exception contemporaneously with the rulemak-
ing process and state with specificity their reasons for invoking the 
exception. In addition, courts should apply a Chenery-type rule to the 
exception, strictly enforcing this new requirement by refusing to con-
sider the applicability of the exception unless the agency invoked it 
during rulemaking. Moreover, courts should consider the exception’s 
applicability only on the grounds articulated by the agency.356 
 It could be a challenge for the courts to impose such a Chenery-
type rule on their own. There is not much of a textual peg for it. In 
stark contrast to the “good cause” exception, the APA’s text does not 
require agencies to specifically invoke the national security exception 
when they proceed without notice-and-comment. As I discuss above, 
Chenery does have a constitutional dimension, however, which pro-
vides it with roots deeper than the APA’s text: it is a means of enforc-
ing the non-delegation doctrine.357 It is true that the courts have long 
recognized that the non-delegation doctrine is much weaker in for-
eign affairs and national security matters.358 In a series of cases, most 
prominently United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,359 the 
courts permitted the President to engage in lawmaking in foreign 
affairs that would not have been permissible in the domestic realm.360 
 Nonetheless, there must be some limit to the President’s power to 
make law, even where national security is concerned. To conclude 
otherwise is to make the error Carl Schmitt made: if national securi-
ty exceptionalism has no discernible limits, it is no longer an excep-
tion but the rule.361 Wherever that limit is must, in the end, be de-
                                                                                                                  
 356. See supra notes 109-115 and accompanying text (discussing the Chenery rule). 
 357. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
 358. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he authority of 
the executive branch to fill gaps is especially great in the context of immigration policy.”). 
 359. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 360. See id. at 319-22. Curtiss-Wright is controversial and has been the subject of 
“withering criticism.” HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990). 
 361. See supra Part IV. 
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termined by the courts. In some recent cases concerning the war 
against terrorist organizations, the Supreme Court seems to have 
recognized this reality.362 Asking courts to better police the bounda-
ries of the national security exception is another way in which the 
courts should ensure that the administrative state operates within 
constitutional bounds.  
 Even if the courts will not recognize the constitutional necessity of 
a Chenery-type rule, and Congress will not reform the APA to require 
it, the President should impose it on agencies through an executive 
order. Whether required by the Constitution or the spirit of the APA, 
procedural reforms must be implemented for the national security 
administrative state to be effective. And it is the President’s duty as 
Commander-in-Chief to ensure that reform happens; the security of 
the nation depends on it. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 National security rulemaking desperately needs less secrecy and 
more public participation. Along with classification reform, the more 
frequent use of notice-and-comment procedures, enforced by the 
courts through a Chenery-type rule, can help immensely. Notice-and-
comment deserves the fulsome praise it has received. A keystone of 
the APA’s “bill of rights” for those affected by agency regulation, it 
encourages deliberative decisionmaking, increases accountability, en-
sures public participation, and legitimates the final agency decision.363 
In short, notice-and-comment rulemaking enhances democratic values.  
 Notice-and-comment rulemaking has also grown more popular as 
technological advances continue to make it easier for the public to 
comment on proposed regulations and the agency to respond. In fact, 
the United States government now proselytizes worldwide for  
the procedure.364  
 However, notice-and-comment rulemaking turns out to be yet an-
other practice that the United States urges for other nations while 
reserving for itself a healthy dose of American exceptionalism. Secre-
cy enshrouds a large portion of the federal bureaucracy performing a 
broad range of national security functions.365  
 The APA’s national security exception plays a more important role 
in establishing and maintaining the national security administrative 
                                                                                                                  
 362. See Knowles, supra note 215, at 91-92 (discussing the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
defer to the government’s claims of military exigency in the enemy combatant cases such as 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)). 
 363. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 364. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process—For 
Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2008); Mendelson, supra note 41, at 1344.  
 365. See, e.g., PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 24, at 22.  
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state than its sporadic invocation by agencies might suggest. To be 
sure, it provides a useful escape hatch for agencies whose rules are 
challenged in court. But more importantly, it is the formal legal in-
carnation of the culture of insularity that dominates national securi-
ty rulemaking. And because the exception informs the rule, under-
standing the scope of this widespread avoidance of notice-and-
comment rulemaking on national security grounds is critical for un-
derstanding how the American administrative state operates as  
a whole.  
 Our bifurcated administrative state evolved from Americans’ am-
biguous views toward fascism and the New Deal. It may have been a 
useful way to address some of that era’s challenges. But today, the 
existence of two overlapping administrative law regimes often en-
courages agencies to select the one subjecting them to less scrutiny. 
And in contexts like the NSA surveillance programs and the post-
September 11 Alien Registration Program, the use of notice-and-
comment would not only have made the agencies more effective in 
achieving their goals, but it also would have protected the rights of 
minorities and the American people in general.366 The present ar-
rangement simply does not make sense in a world where the foreign 
and the domestic are not only intertwined, but are often indistin-
guishable. As the NSA surveillance programs reveal, national securi-
ty rulemaking regulates our lives as intimately as any other kind. It 
deserves our sustained attention and participation.  
                                                                                                                  
 366. See supra notes 10-12, 50-55 and accompanying text. 
